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TAX CONSEQUENCES OF THE FAMILY
PARTNERSHIP
By RiCAiARD W. CAsE*
Perhaps no other income tax problem is so troublesome
today as that presented by the family partnership cases.
Certainly the ever-increasing number of opinions which
have been written by the judges of the Tax Court and
the Circuit Courts of Appeals bears grim witness to this
fact. But in a larger sense the family partnership prob-
lem is only a part of an over-all picture, which, when
viewed in its entirety, presents a continuing effort on the
part of the Government to prevent tax avoidance through
the use of the family unit. The related topics of the taxa-
tion of short term trusts' and family corporations, 2 dis-
cussed in detail elsewhere, should be kept in mind, there-
fore, as one attempts to solve the problem at hand. More-
over, the balancing factors of the protection of the Federal
revenues and the right of every individual legally to min-
imize his tax burden should not be forgotten when dealing
with the family partnership cases.
This paper presents an analysis of the problems which
are the outgrowth of the family partnership status as that
term is used in its common law sense. As a result, no
attempt will be made to do more than comment upon those
cases involving members of a family who are engaged in
joint enterprises,3 pools, 4 syndicates, or other unincor-
* Of the Baltimore City Bar. A. B., 1941, LL. B. 1942, University of
Maryland. Lecturer on Equity Pleading, Taxation, and Negotiable Instru-
ments, University of Maryland School of Law.
'Infra, n. 148.
1 Case, Disregard of Corporate Entity in Federal Taivatlon--The Modern
Approach (1944) 30 Va. L. Rev. 398.
3 The distinction between joint enterprises, pools, syndicates, and other
unincorporated organizations on the one hand, and common law partner-
ship on the other, is a shadowy one. It has been suggested that the word
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porated organizations.5 Since tenants in common, tenants
by the entirety and property holders in marital communi-
ties are not ordinarily considered to be partnerships for
tax purposes,6 they are without the scope of this paper.7
However, references will be made, at appropriate places,
to those cases in which the courts have indicated that no
technical common law partnership could exist between
members of a family because of disabilities of local law,
but where it has been held that income derived from prop-
erty employed in a family business which was separately
"partnership" for tax purposes is the generic term, and that a joint
enterprise, for instance, is merely one part of the whole. Harold G.
Parker, 39 B. T. A. 423 (1939). The better-considered cases hold that
a joint enterprise or joint adventure is an arrangement between two or
more persons for the purpose of undertaking a single transaction. Thus,
in Motter v. Smyth, 77 F. (2d) 77 (C. C. A. 10th, 1935) the Court held
that an arrangement between a father and son was a joint adventure,
where it appeared that they had agreed to cooperate for the purposes of
selling a railroad, the father acting as contact man and the son super-
vising office detail. The Court stated that it was not necessary in such
situations for the parties to the arrangement to furnish capital or services
in equal amounts. See also Thomas F. Kelley, 9 B. T. A. 834 (1927);
H. S. Tuthill, 22 B. T. A. 887 (1931); I. T. 2022, 111-1 CUM. BULL. 9
(1924). In a few jurisdictions, the rule prevails that a husband and
wife cannot be considered as partners in the same firm. Such disabilities
of local law, however, have not generally militated against a taxpayer's
position where the facts are clear that income from a business was
actually earned by his wife or by property owned by her. In such cases,
the income earned by a wife or her property has been taxed to her, and
not to her husband. One theory upon which these cases have been based
is to the effect that what would ordinarily be a business partnership in
states allowing such a relationship between husband and wife will be
considered a joint venture for tax purposes if local law prohibits a tech-
nical partnership between spouses. See L. F. Sunlin, 6 B. T. A. 1232 (1927).
4A pool, as distinguished from a joint enterprise, has been held to have
been in existence where parties contributed capital for the purposes of
future investments. The continuing nature of the relationship seems
to be the distinguishing characteristic. First National Bank of Duluth,
Adm., 13 B. T. A. 1069 (1928); Claude Nolan, 16 B. T. A. 1233 (1929)
semble. For a case in which a pooling arrangement was held to be merely
an anticipatory assignment of income, therefore remaining taxable to
him who earns it, see Walter P. Villere, B. T. A. Memo. Op., Dkt. 106296
(April 7, 1942) Aff'd per eurian Villere v. Commissioner, 133 F.(2d) 905
(C. C. A. 5th, 1943).
6In Champlin v. Commissioner, 71 F.(2d) 23 (C. C. A. 10th, 1934), the
Court, in reversing the Board's determination that no partnership existed,
placed its decision on the fact that a husband and wife had formed a
"mining partnership" under local (Oklahoma) law, and held that this
relationship should be recognized for tax purposes.
6 MEMTENS, LAW OF FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION (1942) §35.02, p. 87.
It was contended by the Government that brothers, who held a portion
of their father's estate as tenants in common, were taxable as partners
under the phrase "other unincorporated organizations" found in §801 of
the Revenue Act of 1934, in Estate of Edgar S. Appleby, 41 B. T. A. 18
(1940) Affd on other grounds Commissioner v. Appleby's Estate, 123
F.(2d) 700 (C. C. A. 2nd, 1941). This contention was rejected by the
Board, and abandoned on appeal.
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owned by a wife has been taxed to her and not to her
husband.
Required Essentials in Family Partnership Cases.
A leading authority has commented that a working defi-
nition of the term "partnership" for tax purposes is ex-
ceedingly difficult, if not impossible, to state with any
degree of accuracy.8 It is surprising to find, therefore, that
it was not until 1932 that an attempted definition or classi-
fication of the term was forthcoming from Congress
However, the Code now provides,1° as did the Revenue Acts
subsequent to 1932, that the term "partnership" includes:
"a syndicate, group, pool, joint venture, or other
unincorporated organization, through or by means of
which any business, financial operation, or venture is
carried on, and which is not, within the meaning of
this title, a trust or estate or a corporation."
The Code definition is not exclusive." It has been sug-
gested, moreover, that the Section was intended to clarify
the confusion which had existed under prior Acts with
respect to the time and manner of returning income from
the operation of joint ventures, syndicates, pools and other
similar organizations, and was not intended to present a
working definition of such associations.'2
If the Code is deficient in providing a useful definition
of the term "partnership", this deficiency is more than
overcome by the legion of cases which have dealt with the
problem. While these cases have detailed a wide variety
of factual patterns, they do establish, for the most part,
8 6 MERTENs, LAW OF FEnoERA INCOME TA&xIoN (1942) §35.02, pp. 86-88.
'Revenue Act of 1932, §1111 (a) (3).
10Int. Rev. Code §3797 (a) (2).
"16 MERTENs, LAW OF FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION (1942) §35.03, p. 89.
"H. R. REP. No. 708, 72nd Cong., 1st Sess. (1932), 1939-1 (Part 2)
Cum. BuLL. 495; SEN. REP. No. 6G5, 72nd Cong., 1st Sess. (1932), 1931-
1 (Part 2) Cum. BuLL 538. Both reports indicate that confusion existed
over the requirements of prior Acts as to the time and manner of return-
ing income from the operations of joint ventures, syndicates, pools and
similar organizations, and then proceed to deal only with syndicates. No
expressed definition is set forth of the various associations which were
included in the new Section. The reports conclude that the new pro-




certain fundamental requirements which must be present
before a family partnership will be recognized. Granted
that one travels on treacherous ground when an attempt
is made to generalize for tax purposes, it is nevertheless
believed that the requirements found in the majority of
family partnership cases can be crystallized into rules
which will be determinative of whether or not a true
partnership exists between members of a given family,
or whether the legal formalities entered into between the
parties amount to nothing more than an attempt to reallo-
cate income within a family unit.
The first requirement which must be present before
a family partnership will be recognized for tax purposes
is a finding that the parties have formed an organization
which is to be used for some purpose other than merely
as a device to reduce the surtax bracket of the chief in-
come producing member of the family, whose economic
position has remained unchanged as a result of the creation
of the firm. Coupled with this requirement is the corol-
lary that it must appear that the members of the family
have formed a relationship in which they each have a
mutual interest in the profits or losses of the enterprise.
In the ordinary case, such findings might be sufficient to
sustain the existence of a partnership. Family partnership
cases, however, require in addition that at least one of two
other prerequisites be met. The first of these is that if the
firm receives its income chiefly from personal services,
it must be shown that the family members supplied such
services to the firm, with the understanding that the con-
tributors were partners and not employees of the enter-
prise. The second additional prerequisite is to the effect
that if capital is an important element in the production of
firm revenues, it must be shown that each family member
contributed as a partner to the firm either his own capital
or valuable services which directly augmented partnership
income.
The first requirement mentioned above relates to the
creation of a firm for the purposes of saving personal taxes.
To meet the impact of this prerequisite, the contention is
[VOL. VIII
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uniformly made by the taxpayer that a person should be
able to adjust his property or business in any way he sees
fit for the purpose of saving taxes, so long as he stays
within the letter of the law. Before a decision can be
reached on the applicability of the requirement, therefore,
it is necessary to determine the exact character of the "tax
saving" which has been the basis for the disregard of
family partnerships.
The type of "tax saving" which has been held to be the
basis for the disregard of family partnerships has as its
end product the splitting of surtaxes by means of chan-
neling income earned by one person or his property to
another person in the same family group who was not
responsible for its production, by means of the partnership
device. It is not altogether accurate to state, therefore,
that the requirement under consideration will foreclose
the recognition of a family partnership merely because
the firm was created for the purpose of saving personal
taxes."8 It should be permissible, for instance, for a hus-
band irrevocably and unconditionally to give one-half of
the capital used in his business to his wife and for the
parties thereafter to form a partnership which woild re-
sult in a division of family income. However, before such
a partnership will be recognized for tax purposes, it must
appear that the husband has changed his economic position
as a result of the gift of assets and the organization of the
firm. If this has been done, it cannot be said that the
parties have attempted to split the husband's surtax
bracket by means of channeling income earned by him
or his property to his wife through the partnership, be-
cause one-half of the income has been earned by property
owned by the wife. Moreover, it should be permissible
for members of a family who are stockholders in a family
I" The courts have stated on various occasions that if the parties formed
a family partnership for legitimate business reasons, the mere fact that
they knew a tax saving would result would not be grounds for disregard-
ing the firm. Thus, in Davis B. Thornton, 5 T. C. , No. 13 (1945), a
family partnership was recognized even though the predominant motive
in establishing the firm was the taxpayer's desire to save Federal income
taxes, where it appeared that another motive was to strengthen the
credit of the business by making the wife, who owned a large estate, a
member of the firm.
19441
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corporation which has been recognized for tax purposes, 4
to dissolve the corporation and form a partnership for the
purpose of avoiding the taxes which are incident to doing
business in corporate form.15 In such cases, the partner-
ship is formed to save the tax cost of doing business in a
particular way, rather than to create a legal subterfuge
for the purpose of splitting a tax bracket. 6 This type of
tax saving should not be the basis for disregarding a family
partnership. 7
1
, Case, Disregard of Corporate Entity in Federal Tawation--The Modern
Approach (1944) 30 Va. L. Rev. 389.15 In this situation the end product is not the splitting of surtaxes, but
an attempt by the parties to have income taxed only once instead of
twice. If income from the family corporation has been legally distrib-
uted to stockholders, the same percentage of distribution should be made
under the partnership arrangement. As a result, the creation of the
partnership will not change the percentage of business profits received
by each of its participants and it cannot be said that the plan was entered
into for the purpose of shifting part of the tax burden to members of a
family who did not earn the income in question. This distinction has
been made in Davis B. Thornton, 5 T. C. , No. 13 (1945).
"This reasoning is clearly recognized in Tower v. Commissioner, 148
F.(2d) 388 (C. C. A. 6th, 1945). There the Government attempted to
sustain the Tax Court's determination that a family partnership should
be disregarded on the grounds that the firm was created solely to save
taxes. The facts showed that the tax saving in question resulted from
the elimination of corporate taxes by means of dissolving a family cor-
poration and the formation of a partnership. The Court stated that if
the contention made by the Government were sound, then no matter
what advantage there might be, taxwise or otherwise, in transforming a
closely-held corporation into a partnership, such change would never,
for tax purposes, be recognized. See also Charles F. Goodwin, et al., T. C.
Memo. Op., Dkts. 3343, 3344 (Oct. 9, 1944); William J. Hirsch, T. C.
Memo. Op., Dkt. 2185 (Jan. 3, 1945).
11 Close questions will arise in those cases in which a taxpayer gives
stock in a family corporation to his wife, and then dissolves the cor-
poration. Here the answer must turn on whether or not the gift was
absolute on its face, and in fact divested the taxpayer of all economic
control over the subject matter of the gift. Thus, in Jacob De Korse, et al.,
5 T. C. No. 11 (1945) the Court refused to recognize a family part-
nership which was created by the giving of stock in a close corporation
to members of the families of the two principal stockholders, coupled with
a dissolution of the corporation and a transfer of its assets to the partner-
ship. The Court reasoned that by viewing the transaction as a* whole
it was clear that the taxpayers did not intend to make out-and-out gifts
of the assets of the business to the members of their families, but only
intended to give them a portion of the income from the business for the
purpose of avoiding income tax liability. See also 0. William Lowry,
3 T. C. 730 (1944). On appeal, Circuit Court, Sixth Circuit; R. W. Cam-
field, T. C. Memo. Op., Dkt. 112451 (Feb. 9, 1941) On appeal, Circuit
Court, Sixth Circuit. However, in Davis B. Thornton, 5 T. C. No. 13
(1945) the taxpayer made an unconditional and irrevocable gift of stock
in a wholly owned corporation to his wife, which gave the wife the right
to do what she pleased with the subject matter of the gift. Thereafter,
the corporation was dissolved, and title to one-half of its assets was
transferred to the wife. A partnership was then formed, the wife con-
tributing the assets which stood in her name to the firm. The Court
[VOL. VIII
FAMILY PARTNERSHIPS
Relatively few early cases recognized the principle that
if a firm was formed merely to save personal taxes without
changing the economic position of the head of a family,
the partnership was not formed for a bona fide business
purpose and should therefore be disregarded.' Moreover,
there was contrary authority.19 In B. M. Phelps," the
Board, in recognizing a family partnership for tax pur-
poses, had no hesitancy in stating that it was immaterial
that the apparent object of the reorganization of the firm
was the reduction of surtaxes, the reason being that the
taxpayers had the right to change their methods of doing
business "as long as they kept within the spirit of the
law".2' Even after the decision in Gregory v. Helvering,22
the Board was reluctant to disregard a family partnership
solely on these grounds.23  This was true even though
the evidence supported a finding that the taxpayer had
become concerned about increased Federal taxes, and had
sought and received advice from his tax counselor to form
a family partnership with his wife.24  However, in sus-
taining family partnerships involving tax-conscious parties,
the Board was careful to point to other considerations
which would tip the scales in the taxpayer's favor.25 More
recently, the Tax Court has taken pains to point to the
bona fide business purpose which motivated the formation
of the firm before it would be recognized for tax purposes. 8
stated that it could find no such continuation of domination and control
over the subject matter of the gift which would justify non-recognition
of its reality. The partnership was sustained.
u James H. Persons, 5 B. T. A. 716 (1926).
19 However, a finding by the Board that the parties entered into a family-
partnership arrangement long before they realized that a tax advantage
could be gained thereby was given weight in border-line cases. Leonard
M. Gunderson, 23 B. T. A. 45 (1931).
-' 13 B. T. A. 1248 (1928). This was one of the earliest cases in which
the Board commented upon a contention advanced by the Government that
the partnership was formed solely for the purposes to avoid surtaxes.
21B. M. Phelps, 13 B. T. A. 1248, 1250 (1928).
293 U. S. 465 (1935).
Justin Potter, 47 B. T. A. 607 (1942). The Board did point out, how-
ever, that, read in its entirety, the record did not reveal a clear-cut plan
on the part of the taxpayer to evade Federal income taxes.24Walter W. Moyer, 35 B. T. A. 1155 (1937). The Board stated that
an agreement or transaction was not rendered ineffectual merely because
it was entered into or motivated by a purpose to avoid taxes.
" Sidney M. Harvey, B. T. A. Memo. Op., Dkt. 109298 (Oct. 14, 1942) Cf.
Thomas M. McIntyre, 37 B. T. A. 812 (1938) (Partnership disregarded).
-J. D. Johnston, Jr., 3 T. C. 799 (1944) ; Benjamin Shander, T. C. Memo.
Op., Dkt. 111788 (March 11, 1943); Julius Caesar Haley, T. C. Memo. Op.,
1944]
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The rule which is applied today by the Circuit Courts
of Appeals27 and the Tax Court is undoubtedly to the
effect that a family partnership will not be recognized if
it has no real business function and if the only apparent
purpose for its organization was an attempt to split the
surtax bracket of the chief income producer of the family,
whose economic position remained unchanged as a result
of the formation of the firm.28 In such cases, a finding that
the partnership was formed primarily to save personal
taxes, without a corresponding change in the economic posi-
tion of the parties, will negative the existence of a true
business purpose, and this is considered sufficient to invoke
the Gregory principle. 29 Thus, in A. L. Lusthaus, ° a tax-
payer who had operated as a sole proprietor a retail fur-
niture store, and who was advised by his lawyer and ac-
countant to make his wife a partner in the business for
the purpose of reducing his personal taxes, received as a
tax evaluation of his activities a statement to the effect
that: 3
"Finally, the partnership emerged from the meta-
morphosis clothed in the outer garment of legal re-
Dkt. 5658 (Jan. 23, 1945). But see Sidney Nathan, et al., T. C. Memo.
Op., Dkts. 102726, 102727, 102728, 102730 (May 14, 1943) for a case in
which a family partnership was sustained even though the Tax Court
recognized the fact that tax saving was one of the principal reasons
motivating the formation of the firm.2
7 Bradshaw v. Commissioner, 150 F. (2d) 918 (. C.A. 10th, 1945) ; Grant v.
Commissioner, F. (2d) (C. C. A. 10th, 1945) ; Earp v. Jones, 131 F. (2d)
292 (C. C. A. 10th, 1942) Cert. denied 318 U. S. 764 (1943); Tinkoff v.
Commissioner, 120 F.(2d) 564 (C. C. A. 7th, 1941) Cert. denied 314 U. S.
581 (1941). See also Blalock v. Allen, 56 F. Supp. 266 (M. D. Ga., 1944).
28A. L. Lusthaus, 3 T. C. 540 (1944) Aff'd Lusthaus v. Commissioner,
149 F.(2d) 232 (C. 0. A. 3rd, 1945) ; Clarence L. Fox, et al., 5 T. C.
No. 26 (1945); J. G. Fredeking, T. C. Memo. Op., Dkt. 110082 (Oct. 21,
1943); R. W. Camfield, T. C. Memo. Op., Dkt. 112451 (Feb. 9, 1944) On
appeal, Circuit Court, Sixth Circuit; Edward J. Miller, T. C. Memo. Op.,
Dkt. 3300 (March 18, 1944) ; Stanley Bradshaw, T. C. Memo. Op., Dkt. 334
(July 31, 1944) Aff d Bradshaw v. Commissioner, 150 F. (2d) 918 (C. C. A.
10th, 1945); Joseph W. Grant, et al., T. C. Memo. Op., Dkts. 407, 416
(August 3, 1944) Aff'd Grant v. Commissioner, 150 F. (2d) 915 (C. C. A. 10th.
1945); Irwin J. Miller, T. C. Memo. Op., Dkt. 2272 (Oct. 9, 1944) Aff'd
per curia/m F. (2d) (C. C. A. 2nd, 1945). The same rule had been
applied by the Board in Thomas M. McIntyre, B. T. A. Memo. Op., Dkts.
107685, 109693 (July 25, 1942).
0. William Lowry, 3 T. C. 730 (1944) On appeal, Circuit Court, Sixth
Circuit.
'03 T. C. 540 Affid Lusthaus v. Commissioner, 149 F. (2d) 232 (C. C. A.
3rd, 1945).81 A. L. Lusthaus, 3 T. C. 540. 542 (1944).
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spectability, but inwardly perhaps a little uneasy over
the flimsiness of its undergarment of income tax al-
leviation."
Moreover, at least one case has indicated that the parties
must combine for the purpose of conducting a "lawful"
business. 32  However, this would seem to be an unwar-
ranted extension of the requirement, especially when it
is considered that the income received in an unlawful busi-
ness is fully taxable, and that for the most part the busi-
ness is "unlawful" by virtue of some local law provision
which should have no effect upon the taxability of the
parties under the Federal income tax.
The corollary to the first requirement which must be
present before a family partnership will be recognized for
tax purposes is not peculiar to family firms, but is a gen-
eral test which must be met by any partnership before its
existence will be sustained. This requirement is, in effect,
that it must clearly appear from the evidence that the
parties have entered into a relationship in which they have
a mutual interest in the profits or losses of the enterprise.
The test stems from the fact that it is possible for members
of a family to associate themselves in a common business
undertaking on some plane other than that of a partner-
ship status. For instance, a father and son might agree to
conduct a mercantile business with the understanding that
the son's compensation would be determined by a per-
centage of net profits. If such an arrangement were solely
for the purpose of determining the amount of compen-
sation that the son should receive, and in reality gave him
no community of interest in the profits or losses of the
firm with his father, no partnership has been created.3 3
The requirement that all partners must have a mutual
interest in the profits or losses of the enterprise has been
2E. C. Ellery, 4 T. C. 407 (1944).
0 The same result should be reached where a father wishes to make
continuing gifts to his child to be paid from the profits of his business.
Thus in John W. Graham, 8 B. T. A. 1081 (1927) Aff'd Graham v. United
States, 44 F.(2d) 566 (C. C. A. 7th, 1930), a father and son agreed that
the son should have for his own one third of the profits from a partner-
ship composed of the father and his wife. The agreement further stip-
ulated that the son's income should be reduced by one-third of any losses
sustained by the business. The Board held that the son was not a partner.
19441
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taken from the common law. The Board has drawn from
Chancellor Kent,34 Story,35 and definitions enunciated by
the Supreme Court 6 in establishing this principle. It has
been held that an arrangement whereby the taxpayer re-
tained absolute discretion in the manner, method and
amount of expenditures and the division of profits, de-
prived the remaining family partners of any community of
interest in such profits, and as a result the partnership
was disregarded.37  Other cases have stressed the lack of
a proprietary interest in profits in refusing to recognize a
family partnership, where it appeared that the income re-
ceived by a family member came through an agreement
with the taxpayer rather than directly from the business.3 8
Mutual liability for the loss of profits or capital should
also be present before a family partnership is recognized
for tax purposes. However, in at least one case, the Board
has indicated that an expressed agreement to share losses
was not essential to the existence of a firm.3 9
Before a family partnership will be recognized for tax
purposes, there must be present at least one of two other
requirements in addition to the prerequisite discussed
above. Both of these requirements depend to some extent
3 4 John W. Graham, 8 B. T. A. 1081, 1083 (1927); R. C. McKnight, 13
B. T. A. 885, 888 (1928); Samuel J. Lidov, 16 B. T. A. 1421, 1425 (1929).
This standard definition is as follows:
A contract of two or more competent persons to place their money,
effects, labor and skill, or some or all of them, in lawful commerce
or business, and to divide the profits and bear the loss in certain
proportions.
John W. Graham, 8 B. T. A. 1081, 1083 (1927).
3Meehan v. Valentine, 145 U. S. 611 (1892). The Court there stated
that the essentials of a partnership were (p. 618) :
The requisites of a partnership are that the parties must have joined
together to carry on a trade or adventure for their common benefit,
each contributing property or services, and having a community of
interest in the profits.
The definition is accepted in the following family partnership cases:
M. L. Virden, 6 B. T. A. 1123 (1927) ; J. Howard Coombs, 20 B. T. A. 1021
(1930); Leonard M. Gunderson, 23 B. T. A. 45 (1931); Jasper Sipes, 31
B. T. A. 709 (1934) ; Irene McCullough, et al., T. C. Memo. Op., Dkts. 1710,
1711 (July 19, 1944).
m T. L. Talley, 22 B. T. A. 712 (1931) Cf. Richard H. Oakley, 24 B. T. A.
1082 (1931).
'Ed Kasch, et al., 25 B. T. A. 284 (1932) Aff'd Kasch v. Commissioner,
63 F.(2d) 466 (C. C. A. 5th, 1933) Cert. denied 290 U. S. 644 (1933);
Robert S. Eaton, 37 B. T. A. 283 (1938) Aff'd without opinion Eaton v.
Commissioner, 100 F. (2d) 1013 (C. C. A. 2nd, 1939) Cert. denied 307 U. S.
636 (1939).
'*Jasper Sipes, 31 B. T. A. 709 (1934).
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upon the nature of the income-producing factor of the
firm. The general rule is that if the profits of a partner-
ship are derived chiefly from capital, it must be shown that
the partners contributed to the firm capital owned by them,
or services, with the understanding that such contribu-
tions were made as partners. However, if the chief source
of firm income is derived from personal services, it must
be shown that each partner contributed such services to
the partnership as a partner.
In cases in which firm profits depend chiefly upon the
use of capital and in which one member of a family has
supplied no capital to the firm but has contributed services
which were an important factor in the realization of that
income,1° with the understanding that such services were
contributed as a partner,4 the partnership will be recog-
nized for tax purposes. In such cases, the courts have
adopted the sound policy of recognizing an agreement be-
tween members of a family to the effect that one of them
would supply services to the firm in the capacity of a
partner.42 A momentary reflection will reveal, moreover,
that if this were not true the courts would have to take
the position that they had the right to recast an agree-
ment made between members of a family in a way which
would be contrary to the terms of the understanding itself.
Thus a wife should be considered the business partner of
her husband even though she has contributed no assets
4 This requirement rules out such services as entertaining a husband's
business associate in the family home, or other purely social activities
which might indirectly contribute to the success of the husband's business.
Such services, "in so far as they relate to business at all, are of the same
nature and character as those which might reasonably be expected of any
woman having an interest in the success of her husband's business en-
deavors." L. D. Simmons, 4 T. C. 1012 (1945).
"If services are contributed to a family business by the wife of the
taxpayer under an agreement whereby the wife is a mere employee, such
services cannot be relied upon to prove the existence of a partnership. Avent
v. Commissioner, 76 F. (2d) 386 (C. C. A. 5th, 1935) ; Francis Doll, 2 T. C.
276 (1943) Aff'd Doll v. Commissioner, 149 F.(2d) 239 (C. C. A. 8th,
1945) Gert. Applied June 19, 1945.
I" Of course, the members of the family must prove by a preponderance
of the evidence that such an agreement actually existed. As pointed
out at another point in this paper, a great number of varying factors
may be drawn upon for such purposes. Moreover, it should be kept in
mind that in sending a notice of deficiency, the Government has in effect
denied the existence of any such agreement, and the taxpayer has the
burden of proof to show that it had been made and was in force.
1944]
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of her own to the business, if the facts clearly show that
she spent her entire time in rendering necessary services
to the firm.4" In such situations, border-line cases may
develop as to whether or not such services are "necessary"
or "directly contribute to the realization of partnership
income"." However, the answers to these narrow points
must, of necessity, turn on the facts of each particular
case, and so no general rule can be stated with any degree
of accuracy which would cover them all. In situations
in which firm revenues do not depend primarily upon the
use of capital but are conditioned upon the reputation,
"Frank E. Eyestone, 12 B. T. A. 1232 (1928) (Sons agreed to help
pay off a mortgage); John Peters, 16 B. T. A. 895 (1929) (Sons agreed
to leave part of their share of earnings in the firm) ; James N. Purse,
27 B. T. A. 725; Irene McCullough, et al., T. C. Memo. Op., Dkts. 1710,
1711 (July 19, 1944) ; M. W. Turner, et al., T. C. Memo. Op., Dkts. 2460,
2461 (Nov. 30, 1944). See a18o Sidney M. Harvey, B. T. A. Memo. Op.,
Dkt. 109298 (Oct. 14, 1942) (No technical partnership because of dis-
abilities of Michigan law). But see E. C. Ellery, 4 T. C. 407 (1944) in
which a wife contributed valuable services to a firm which was never-
theless disregarded because it was engaged in a business which was un-
lawful under state law.
"If a partnership derived its entire income from investments, services
might neither be necessary nor directly augment the income of the firm.
In such cases, a contention that services were contributed by a partner
who had put no capital into the business would be a sham, and should
not be a basis for a finding that a partnership existed for tax purposes.
In the great majority of cases, however, capital is only the chief income-
producing factor of the partnership. In any manufacturing business, for
example, it is necessary to combine services in the form of managerial
skill with capital before the enterprise can operate at all. In such situa-
tions, the question will arise as to the nature of the wife's services in
relation to the over-all picture. It has been held, in numerous cases, that
if a wife contributes her time to the performance of "office duties" such
services will be partially determinative of the existence of the firm.
Arthur Stryker, 17 B. T. A. 1033 (1929) ; Leonard M. Gunderson, 23 B.
T. A. 45 (1931); J. Kammerdiner, 25 B. T. A. 495 (1932) ; George A.
Croft, T. C. Memo. Op., Dkt. 1432 (Oct. 11, 1944). Unfortunately, these
cases do not present a clear-cut answer to the question of whether or not
"office duties", standing alone, will be sufficient to sustain a family part-
nership which receives its chief source of income from the use of capital,
since in each case the wife also contributed some capital. It is believed,
however, that a contribution of "office services" on a full time basis by
a member of a family should be sufficient to sustain a family partnership
whose chief income-producing factor is capital, if such services were
contributed under a bona fide understanding that they were rendered
as a partner, and not as an employee of the organization. On the other
hand, it is doubtful whether the supplying of office duties would make
the contributor a partner in a business which receives its chief source
of revenues from personal services. It could hardly be questioned, for
instance, that an attorney could not make his wife a partner for tax
purposes on the grounds that she acted as his secretary. In such cases,
the rule should be that each person engaged in the business should con-
tribute or attempt to contribute some earning power to It by means of
his own reputation, skill or personality, before he will be considered a
partner in the enterprise.
1944] FAMILY PARTNERSHIPS
skill or personalities of the persons conducting the business,
a family member must show that he contributed personal
services which directly augmented the partnership income
before he will be considered a member of the firm for tax
purposes.45  It should be emphasized that the supplying
of personal services by each member of the family is an
absolute requirement in this type of case before they will
be recognized as partners in a family business.
Where the existence of a family partnership depends
solely upon the contribution of capital to the enterprise
by a family member, the firm will not be recognized unless
it can be shown that capital is an important element in
the production of income and that the assets supplied by the
family member were in reality his property and not that of
another member of the same family group. The principal
reason for the development of this requirement was to pre-
vent the creation of family partnerships by means of an
assignment to a family member of an interest in the in-
come of a business as distinguished from an assignment
of an interest in firm assets. The sub-partnership was
condemned at an early date by the Board,4 6 and the only
0H. J. Barton, 3 B. T. A. 1262 (1926); H. T. Loper, 12 B. T. A. 164
(1928); W. H. Simmons, 22 B. T. A. 1106 (1931); S. R. 6998, V-1 Cum.
BuL. 268 (1926). See also Peter F. Loftus, T. C. Memo. Op., Dkt. 617
(Sept. 20, 1944), where the nature of the business was that of a "con-
sulting engineer". The Tax Court was seemingly impressed with the
necessity of capital in the business for the purpose of meeting a large
payroll, and relied to some extent on Humphreys v. Commissioner, 88
F.(2d) 430 (C. C. A. 2nd, 1937). However, even if the business is con-
sidered as one deriving most of its income from personal services, the
valuable services contributed by the wife should justify the result. It should
be emphasized, moreover, that a contribution of capital and no services
to a firm which derives the major part of its income from personal services
will not be sufficient to make the contributor a partner in the firm. Thus
in Leo J. Feistel, T. C. Memo. Op., Dkt. 1511 (Jan. 27, 1945) it was proved
that a wife had contributed some capital to her husband's insurance
business, and that as a result she was made a partner in the enterprise.
The Court reasoned that the income of the business was derived chiefly
from the personal services of the taxpayer and not from the use of capital,
and therefore refused to recognize the wife as a partner, irrespective of
her admitted contribution of capital to the firm. The same reasoning is
used in G. Elliott Krusen, et al., T. C. Memo. Op., Dkt. 750 (Aug. 3, 1944)
ADff per curiam Krusen v. Commissioner, 148 F. (2d) 210 (C. C. A. 3rd,
1945; D. H. Mchlachern, 5 T. C. No. 4 (1945).
46A common pattern was that in which a husband, who was conducting
his business as a partnership with a third party, sought to make his wife
a sub-partner by giving her a percentage of his "interest" in the firm
profits. Such arrangements were held not sufficient to make the wife a
partner, and the husband remained taxable on his distributable share
of firm profits. Ormsby McKnight Mitchel, 1 B. T. A. 143 (1924) Aff'4
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family partnership case which has been considered by the
Supreme Court held that it must clearly appear that the
family members had an interest in the assets of the firm
rather than a mere right to receive a part of its income,
before the partnership could be recognized for tax pur-
poses.4 7
To aid analysis, it is convenient to divide this require-
ment into two parts. Initially, it must appear that capital
is an important element in the production of firm income.
Although this problem is beset with difficulty and pregnant
with border-line situations, a majority of the cases should
be capable of decision by an application of every-day
knowledge. Thus, a law partnership, an accounting firm,
a business receiving its income from commissions on sales
made by its participants, or a partnership deriving its in-
come chiefly from the personal efforts of one of its mem-
bers should not ordinarily be considered as employing cap-
ital as a principal factor in the production of its revenues.
On the other hand, a partnership formed to invest in real
estate, stocks or bonds, a firm engaged in selling merchan-
dise which it owns to the public, a partnership engaged
in the manufacturing or processing of commodities for
sale to the public, or a firm devoted to mining or the
lumber business should be considered as engaged in a busi-
ness in which capital is an important element in the pro-
duction of income. In this connection, it should be recog-
Mitchel v. Bowers, 9 F. (2d) 414 (S. D. N. Y., 1925) Affd Mitchel v.
Bowers, 15 F.(2d) 287 (C. C. A. 2nd, 1926) Cert. denied 273 U. S. 759
(1927); Yale Kneeland, 1 B. T. A. 150 (1924); Hudson M. Knapp, 5
B. T. A. 762 (1926); Samuel Kurzman, 8 B. T. A. 412 (1927); Sam H.
Harris, 11 B. T. A. 871 (1928) Aff'd Harris v. Commissioner, 39 F.(2d)
546 (C. C. A. 2nd, 1930); J. Fred Staebler, 17 B. T. A. 1086 (1929)
(decided under provisions of Michigan law) ; Houston Brothers, 22 B. T. A.
51 (1931). The same rule was applied after a taxpayer ceased to do
business with the third party. George M. Cohan, 11 B. T. A. 743 (1928)
Aff'd Cohan v. Commissioner, 39 F.(2d) 540 (C. C. A. 2nd, 1930). One
case seems inconsistent. In C. R. Thomas, 8 B. T. A. 118 (1927) a tax-
payer sold one-half of his interest in his partnership to his daughter for
$1500. The taxpayer's partner never knew of the interest held by the
daughter. The Board held that while the daughter did not become a
partner in the business, it did not follow that the taxpayer should be taxed
on his entire distributive share. It was reasoned that the daughter had
purchased a share in the corpus of the taxpayer's partnership interest,
as distinguished from a mere right to participate in future earnings. See
also G. C. M. 3412, VII-1 Cum. BuLL. 106 (1928).
47Burnet v. Leininger, 285 U. S. 138 (1932).
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nized that the mere fact that a partnership owns a large
amount of capital which is not actively employed for the
purpose of earning income is not determinative. While
this might be a factor to be taken into consideration, the
real question is whether the income was earned primarily
by means of the personalities, skill or reputation of the
persons conducting the business, or was realized from the
use of capital which has been skillfully employed for the
purposes of making money.48
It is not altogether astonishing to find that cases deal-
ing with this phase of the problem have produced irrecon-
cilable conflicts. In Humphrys v. Commissioner49 the
Court sustained a family partnership for tax purposes
where the nature of the business was the practice of tax
law by attorneys and accountants. This result was reached
even though the taxpayers' wives were neither lawyers
nor accountants and contributed no services to the partner-
ship, the Court resting its decision upon the fact that the
wives had contributed all of the initial capital to the enter-
prise.50 It is doubtful whether the Humpherys case should
be followed today, and certainly its doctrine should not
be extended.51 Moreover, the courts should consider in
all cases in which Humpherys v. Commissioner is urged
," In Clarence L. Fox, et al., 5 T. C. No. 26 (1945) it appeared that
the sole source of income of the business had at all times been com-
missions received by two partners for their services as agents for certain
woolen mills. The firm was characterized as one in which the earnings
were attributable to the services of the taxpayers, irrespective of the
fact that it owned $85,000 worth of "Upholstery Designs". See also D. H.
McEachern, 5 T. C. No. 4 (1945). In determining the chief source
of firm revenues, moreover, good will should not be considered as capital.
A law partnership might be said to have "good will" even although it
employed only a modest amount of actual capital in the course of its
practice. However, it could not be said that this type of "capital" would
support a partnership for tax purposes between one of the members of
the firm and his spouse who was a housewife.
88 F.(2d) 430 (C. C. A. 2nd, 1937).
50 The Court was influenced by the fact that the partnership employed
a large staff of personnel, and that the funds to compensate the firm's
employees had been advanced, in the first instance, by the wives of the
taxpayers.5 'An academic speculation might lead to the conclusion that had
Humpherys v. Commissioner reached the Circuit Court after the decision
of the Supreme Court in the Dobson case, the result would have been the
other way. The reason for this lies in the fact that the Board had found,
Adrian C. Humpherys, 33 B. T. A. 1081 (1936), that "the picture here
presented * * * is that of a partnership deriving its income from personal
services". Such a determination would, of course, not be disturbed today,
if there was sufficient evidence in the record to justify the finding.
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too strongly by tax-conscious litigants that in that case
the Government apparently conceded the existence of the
firm on appeal.5 2  In more recent decisions, the Circuit
Courts of Appeals have had no difficulty in finding that
family partnerships devoted to the accounting" or insur-
ance business,5 were in reality personal service partner-
ships, and that they did not require capital for the pur-
poses of producing their income.
Where firm income is the product of a combination of
the use of capital and the services of one or more of its
members, more extensive tests have been drawn upon to
determine the importance of capital in the production of
such income. In these cases, which are by far the most
troublesome, the result has generally been obtained by
means of a comparison of the total income received by
the partnership to the total capital employed in its pro-
duction. The Tax Court has pointed out that capital will
not be considered important in the production of firm in-
come if the facts show that net profits are consistently
several times the capital invested.5 This is true even
though the firm employed technicians who rendered serv-
ices from field offices located in several states. 6 Thus,
in M. M. Argon the Tax Court found that partnership in-
come was produced chiefly from personal services, where
the facts clearly showed that the firm's annual earnings
over a period of years were in excess of fifty per cent. of
the entire capital invested. In other cases, the Court has
characterized income as being produced "mainly" or "pre-
dominantly" from personal services to negative the con-
tention that capital was the chief income-producing fac-
tor.5" However, family partnerships have been recognized
51Humpherys v. Commissioner, 88 F. (2d) 430, 432 (C. C. A. 2nd, 1937).
"Tinkoff v. Commissioner, 120 F. (2d) 564 (C. C. A. 7th, 1941) Cert.
denied 314 U. S. 581 (1941).
54Earp v. Jones, 131 F. (2d) 292 (C. C. A. 10th, 1942) Cert. denied 318
U. S. 764 (1943).
L. D. Simmons, 4 T. C. 1012 (1945).
10 Ernest R. J. Waldburger, B. T. A. Memo. Op., Dkt. 103444 (Sept. 30,
1941) Aff d per curiamn Waldburger v. Commissioner, 131 F. (2d) 598
(C. C. A. 2nd, 1942).
r7 3 T. C. 1120 (1944) Aff'd on other grounds Argo v. Commissioner, 150
F. (2d) 67 (C. C. A. 5th, 1945).
5H. G. Whittenberg, Sr., T. C. Memo. Op., Dkt. 2778 (Sept. 13, 1944).
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for tax purposes where the wife contributed no services
to the enterprise even though the annual earnings of the
firm were more than four times the total capital invested.59
It is impossible to square the results in these cases, but
it would seem that to the extent of the inconsistency, the
approach used in M. M. Argo is perhaps the sounder one.
The second part of the requirement which should be
met where recognition of a family partnership is sought
solely on the grounds that members of a family have con-
tributed capital to the enterprise is that it must be proved
that the capital in question was, in fact, owned by the
partner who contributed it.60 If the Government can show,
for instance, that the capital which was purportedly con-
tributed to the partnership by a wife was in reality owned
by her husband, the firm will be disregarded for tax pur-
poses. While the question in controversy is relatively easy
to state, namely what person was the true owner of certain
assets which had been supplied to a family business, the
solution is perhaps the most difficult to reach of any in the
family partnership cases. This complexity stems from the
definition of the term "ownership" when used taxwise,
and from the varied and conflicting tests which have been
employed by the courts in determining whether or not
a person actually "owned" part of the capital used in a
family partnership.
There is no particular difficulty involved in those cases
in which a member of a family has contributed capital
to a business which came to him from sources other than
by means of gifts from another member of the same family.
Thus a wife should be regarded as the business partner
R. C. Bennett, B. T. A. Memo. Op., Dkt. 101715 (Sept. 2, 1941).
Moreover, it must clearly appear that the capital was contributed as
a partner, and not as a creditor of either the partnership or of one of
the members of the lender's family. If the contribution of capital takes
the latter form, no family partnership exists, even though it might be
said that the lender has an equitable interest in the assets of the firm.
M. A. Long, 8 B. T. A. 737 (1927) ; J. Howard Coombs, 20 B. T. A. 1021
(1930) ; . W. Battleson, 22 B. T. A. 455 (1931). However, it does not
necessarily follow that a husband will be taxed on the entire income
of a business where no family partnership is recognized, if it can be
shown that part of the capital of the enterprise was owned by the wife.
Max German, 2 T. C. 474 (1943); L. C. Binford, T. C. Memo. Op., Dkt.
4386 (June 18, 1945.)
1944]
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of her husband in a family enterprise which derives its
chief source of revenue from the employment of capital,
if she has contributed assets earned as a result of her own
labor, or money left to her from her father's estate.61 In
such cases it is generally true that the husband has no legal
claim to the capital contributed by the wife, and its inde-
pendent ownership is not questioned. The same result
should be reached where a wife borrows capital for the
purposes of going into business with her husband, if the
facts clearly show that the wife's credit was the true basis
for the loan.62
In the great majority of cases, however, capital con-
tributed by one member of the family has been either('given" or "sold" to him by another member of the same
family group.63 It is at this point that the real problem
takes shape. As stated above, the pivotal question is
whether or not the assets were owned by the person who
purportedly contributed them to the business. In an at-
tempt to declare a general rule which would determine
whether or not an effective gift of such assets had been
made by one member of a family to another, the Tax Court
has stated that in addition to the ordinary requirements
"Montgomery v. Thomas, 146 F.(2d) 76 (C. C. A. 5th, 1944); M. L.
Virden, 6 B. T. A. 1123 (1927) ; E. L. Kier, 15 B. T. A. 1114 (1929) ; H. D.
Webster, 4 T. C. , No. 138 (1945). The same result has been reached
in cases dealing with Michigan law, under which no technical partnership
could be created between the spouses. R. E. Wing, 15 B. T. A. 1028 (1929).
1 H. D. Webster, 4 T. C. , No. 138 (1945) ; William J. Hirsch, T. C.
Memo. Op., Dkt. 2185 (Jan. 3, 1945). In J. E. Biggs, Sr., 15 B. T. A. 1092
(1929) the entire capital required for a business was borrowed jointly
by the taxpayer, a business associate and their respective wives. The
Board found that a partnership for tax purposes had been created even
though the wives contributed no services. However, in J. G. Fredeking,
T. C. Memo. Op., Dkt. 110082 (Oct. 21, 1943) a wife purchased a share
in her husband's business by borrowing $3500 without security from a
bank, the loan being approved by the husband and his brother, two of
four bank officers who passed on such matters. The Court stated that
the facts surrounding the granting of the loan clearly showed that the
credit of the taxpayer's wife was unimportant, and that the scheme was
one to avoid taxes.
13 It is believed that the taxpayer should decide before his case is tried
whether he will contend that he has "given" or "sold" assets to a member
of his family. The reason for this is that if the contention is made
that the property was sold by one member of a family to another, the
court might find that title thereto remained in the taxpayer, on the
ground that no technical sale had taken place, even though the evidence
pointed to the fact that a gift of the assets had been made. See W. P.
Sewell, et al., T. C. Memo. Op., Dkts. 112298, 112299, 112339 (Feb. 7, 1944).
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for gifts inter vivos,64 it must appear that there was pres-
ent a clear and unmistakable intention on the part of the
donor irrevocably to divest himself of title, dominion and
control of the subject matter of the gift; that there was
an irrevocable transfer of present legal title and of the
dominion and control of the gift to the donee and a com-
plete divestiture of those attributes of ownership by the
donor; and that there was a delivery by the donor to the
donee of the subject of the gift or of the most effectual
means of commanding the dominion of it.65 Reduced to
its lowest terms, the Tax Court has stated that the donor
must surrender all indicia of ownership and all control over
the asset before the gift will be recognized.
In determining whether or not one member of a family
has surrendered all the indicia of ownership and control
over assets which he has given to a member of his family
and which have been contributed by the donee to the
partnership, the courts should be careful to construe the
deed of gift and the partnership agreement together. This
follows from the fact that the making of the gift and the
formation of the partnership are usually related parts of
one transaction, and also from the fact that both the terms
of the deed of gift and the partnership agreement may bear
on the question of continued control. Thus even although
a gift which is evidenced by a deed is absolute on its face,
the courts should not isolate that transaction but should
consider it with the terms of the partnership agreement,
in order to determine whether or not the family member
in reality had all of the indicia of ownership and control
over the asset which he has contributed to the firm. 6
4 These include: (1) that the donor was competent to make the gift;
(2) that the donee was capable of taking the gift; and (3) an acceptance
of the gift by the donee.
"Frank J. Lorenz, 3 T. C. 746 (1944) Aff'd per curiarn Lorenz v. Com-
missioner, F. (2d) (C. C. A. 6th, 1945) ; Francis E. Tower, 3 T. C.
396 (1944) Rev'd Tower v. Commissioner, 148 F. (2d) 388 (C. C. A. 6th,
1945) ; L. C. Binford, T. C. Memo. Op., Dkt. 4386 (June 18, 1945).
6 The better rule would seem to be that the gift of assets must be abso-
lute. For instance, no gift of capital should be recognized if it is subject
to a possibility of reverter to the donor in the event that the donee should
no longer be the donor's wife, or should attempt to convey her interest
In the capital of the firm to a third party. But there is early authority
to the contrary. L. S. Cobb, 9 B. T. A. 547 (1927). It is doubtful whether
the same rule should apply to gifts made upon the condition that the
1944]
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A careful study of the recent cases67 will reveal that
a majority of them have in substance applied the tests
outlined above. In Justin Potter" the taxpayers, mem-
bers of an existing partnership, made, with the consent
of their partners, irrevocable and unconditional gifts of
part of their partnership interest to their minor children.
At a later time, but before any question was raised by the
Commissioner with respect to the gifts of partnership in-
terests to the children, the business of the partnership was
incorporated, and the children received stock and notes in
proportion to their undivided interests in the firm property.
The Board recognized that the taxpayers exercised some
control over the property, but held, in sustaining the part-
nership, that the control was that of a natural guardian
at law, and not that of an owner of assets.
A number of cases have sustained family partnerships
in which the assets contributed by one family member were
''given" or "sold" to him by another member of his family
if it clearly appeared that each party had all of the inci-
donee will contribute the subject matter thereof to a family partnership
which is to be formed. In these cases, the gift becomes absolute the second
the condition subsequent is complied with. Thereafter there is no possi-
bility of reverter to the donor, and if the donee is otherwise free to control
his interest in the firm and the property is free from the economic
dominance of his family member, the gift should be recognized. Tower
v. Commissioner, 148 F. (2d) 388 (C. C. A. 6th, 1945). However, the
fact that a gift is made upon such conditions might prove, in appropriate
cases, that the parties intended to form a family partnership solely for
the purpose of reducing the personal income tax burden of the chief
income-producing member of the family without changing his economic
position. A finding to this effect is, of course, sufficient basis to disregard
the partnership.
"Some of the earlier cases were extremely liberal in holding that
one member of a family had given or sold assets to another member of
the same family which, in turn, had been contributed by the latter to
a family business. Thus, in Millard D. Olds, 15 B. T. A. 560 (1929)
Aff'd Commissioner v. Olds, 60 F.(2d) 252 (C. C. A. 6th, 1932) the tax-
payer, the sole owner of a dock and lumber business, "sold" a one-fourth
interest in his enterprise to each of his two daughters and received in
payment a $400,000 demand note. The partnership agreement, signed
by the taxpayer and his daughters, provided that the business should
be conducted by the taxpayer in his uncontrolled discretion, that the
daughters could draw firm profits only in the amount that the taxpayer
wished to give them, and that the daughters could inspect the partnership
books at any time and if dissatisfied with the business could withdraw
therefrom and have their notes returned by the taxpayer. The partnership
was recognized. For other early liberal cases, see Richard H. Oakley,
24 B. T. A. 1082 (1931) ; N. H. Hazlewood, 29 B. T. A. 595 (1933) ; Walter
W. Moyer, 35 B. T. A. 1155 (1937).
47 B. T. A. 607 (1942).
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dences of ownership over his respective share.69 In this
respect, the right of each partner to assign his interest
in the firm has been taken as a strong indication that he
had complete dominion and control over his share of
the partnership assets. °  Moreover, the retention of an
unlimited power on the part of one member of the family
to conduct the business as he sees fit has not been held
to be the type of control which prevents a finding that an
irrevocable gift of partnership assets has been made. Part-
nerships have been recognized even though the firm agree-
ments provided that one member of the family should
have exclusive control of the business so far as its finances
were concerned, and also should have absolute power to
distribute profits or retain them in the firm as a credit on
the respective accounts of the partners.7'
The Tax Court has been consistent in holding that if
the existence of a family partnership depends upon the
contribution of capital by each of its members, the firm will
be disregarded if the assets contributed by one family mem-
ber were in reality owned by another member of the same
family group. In this respect, gifts of partnership interests
are disregarded if the purported transfer failed to change
the donor's economic position in any material way. 2 In
reaching this result, the Court has often pointed to the
fact that the family business was carried on in exactly
the same way after the formation of the partnership as it
had been before its creation.7 3 Other cases, in disregarding
family partnerships, have emphasized the complete domin-
19J. D. Johnston, Jr., 3 T. C. 799 (1944); M. W. Smith, 3 T. C. 894
(1944). See also I. T. 1744, 11-2 Cum. BuLL. 179 (1923).70 Sidney Nathan, et al., T. C. Memo. Op., Dkts. 102726, 102727, 102728,
102730 (May 14, 1943).
"Robert P. Scherer, 3 T. C. 776 (1944). However, the agreement also
provided that upon the termination of the partnership there would be
a just and true accounting for firm profits. It thus appears that the
control reserved was over the management of the business, as distinguished
from control over the economic incidence of the interest in the firm held
by other members of the family.
72 This was true even though the wife performed some services for
the enterprise. A. L. Lusthaus, 3 T. C. 540 (1944) Aff'd Lusthaus v. Com-
missioner, 149 F. (2d) 232 (C. C. A. 3rd, 1945).
73 R. W. Camfield, T. C. Memo. Op., Dkt. 112451 (Feb. 9, 1944) On appeal,
Circuit Court, Sixth Circuit; Joseph W. Grant et al., T. C. Memo. Op.,
Dkts. 407, 416 (August 3, 1944) Aff d Grant v. Commissioner, F. (2d)
(C. C. A. 10th, 1945).
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ion and control retained by one member of a family
over the power to determine and distribute profits as dis-
tinguished from the power to run the business as the
managing partner.74  The absence of the power to make
unlimited withdrawals by a family member has been held
to prove that he had no interest in the assets of a part-
nership.76 However, in reaching these conclusions, it has
uniformly been stated that each case must depend upon
its own facts, and for this reason no concrete rules which
would apply in all cases have been laid down with respect
to whether or not one member of a family has surrendered
sufficient control over firm assets to constitute another
member of the same family their owner.7 6
Granted that each member of a family has contributed
assets owned by him to a family partnership, the question
remains as to whether or not the partners should be taxed
on their distributive share of firm income under the part-
nership agreement or on the amount of income which
bears the same relation to the total firm income as the
capital contributed bears to the total firm capital. An
illustration is desirable. Assume that a husband and wife,
with no intention to avoid surtaxes, have formed a part-
nership in which capital is an important element in the
7' 0. William Lowry, 3 T. C. 730 (1944) On appeal, Circuit Court,
Sixth Circuit. In Carl P. Munter et al., 5 T. C. , No. 6 (1945), it
was held that an unlimited power to fix the salaries of the managing
partners which had been retained by those partners was in effect a re-
tained power to control the amount of firm profits which might be dis-
tributed in the future. Such power was held to constitute sufficient
economic control to justify the disregard of the partnership for tax
purposes.
75 Frank J. Lorenz, 3 T. C. 746 (1944) Aff per curam Lorenz v. Com-
missioner, 148 F. (2d) 527 (C. C. A. 6th, 1945) ; Stanley Bradshaw, T. C.
Memo. Op., Dkt. 334 (July 31, 1944) Afl'd Bradshaw v. Commissioner,
F. (2d) (C. C. A. 10th, 1945).
78A case which illustrates the type of continued control which has
been condemned by the Tax Court is Camiel Thorrez, 5 T. C., No. 8
(1945). There "gifts" of partnership interests were made by the part-
ners of an existing firm to members of their families. The "gifts" pro-
vided that their subject matter, the partnership interest, could not be
disposed of by the donees without first offering them to the other part-
ners at their appraised value, and further that they could not be disposed
of to any outsider except upon approval of the partners. Thus the donors
were in a position to prevent any disposition of such interests by refus-
ing to purchase them themselves and by refusing to approve a sale to
any outsider. The Court held that no completed gift had been made
by the taxpayers to the members of their families, and consequently that
no contributions of capital had been made by the latter to the family firm.
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production of firm revenues. Further assume that the
wife performs only nominal services for the firm, but has
contributed $10,000 to its capital which had been irrevo-
cably given to her by the husband. If the husband has
contributed $90,000 to the partnership and if firm income,
which under the partnership agreement is to be divided
equally, is $6000, should the wife be taxed on $3000 or
on $600?
The answer to this problem depends upon a construc-
tion of the Code and the Regulations. It has been held
that if no partnership has been formed by the parties, they
may be taxed on the amount of income which bears the
same relationship to the total income of the business as
the capital contributed by them bears to the total capital
used in the enterprise.71 However, where a partnership
has been created, the Code and Regulations provide that
each partner should be taxed on his distributive share of
firm income.7" If an inequitable result exists because of
7 An interesting and novel approach to this problem is Max German.
2 T. C. 474 (1943). There the taxpayer and his wife had worked together
in various enterprises, each contributing equally to capital and services
until 1930. During this period, the fruits of the spouses' joint endeavors
were invested and reinvested in various businesses conducted by them.
After 1930, the wife contributed few if any services, but the husband,
with the aid of the capital which had been realized by means of joint
effort, continued to engage in a "ham" business. In 1940, the husband
and wife entered into a written partnership agreement with respect to
this business. The Tax Court held that no partnership status existed
between the taxpayer and his wife. However, two important facts were
recognized. First, it was clear that some of the income was derived from
capital, which was at least partially the property of the wife. Secondly,
it was found that the entire income was not attributable to the use of
capital alone, but to a substantial degree to the personal services of the
taxpayer. The Court then held that although no partnership status ex-
isted, the income which could be allocated to the capital owned by the
wife should not be taxed to the taxpayer. It was pointed out that the tax-
payer had not put into the record facts or figures from which the capital
contributed by the wife or the profits which might be allocated thereto
could be determined with any degree of exactness. However, the Court,
on its own motion, made such an allocation on the basis of 75% to the
husband and 25% to the wife. The case reached an undoubtedly equitable
result, but in strict theory may violate the rule requiring the taxpayer
to carry the burden of proof. In this respect, the impact of the rule in
Helvering v. Taylor, 293 U. S. 507 (1935) is obvious.
71 William F. Fischer, 5 T. C. , No. 58 (1945) ; Harriet A. Taylor
et al., 2 B. T. A. 1159 (1925). The contenti6n has been revived that mem-
bers of a family partnership should be taxed 'on an amount of in-
come which bears the same relation to firm profits as capital invested
by the taxpayer bears ,to total firm capital. This theory of determining
the taxability of family partners was rejected in William J. Hirsch, T. C.
Memo. Op., Dkt. 2185 (Jan. 3, 1945). In the course of its opinion, the
Tax Court stated that in certain cases, where individuals conducting a
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this situation, it should be changed by an amend[ment to
the Code and Regulations. Moreover, it is doubtful that
a partnership whose chief income-producing factor is cap-
ital would be sustained by the courts if the facts showed
that a family member contributed only a nominal amount
of his own capital and no service to the firm, but claimed
an equal division of its profits. Such proof would be a
strong indication of the fact that the parties had attempted
to form a partnership for the purpose of avoiding sur-
taxes, without changing the economic position of the finan-
cial head of the family, and this should be enough to jus-
tify its disregard for tax purposes.
Character of the Evidence.
The maze of seeming conflict and inconsistency which
has been the outgrowth of the decisions dealing with
the family partnership problem may best be explained on
the ground that by and large each case has been decided
on the peculiar facts which it has presented. Perhaps no
other observation has been made so often, in cases dealing
with this topic, as the statement that the family partner-
ship problem is, for the most part, a question of fact; and
if a common theme can be found in such cases, it is to the
effect that the sum of all of the facts introduced presents
the touchstone for decision. Granted that an orderly pres-
entation of fact is of considerable importance in all tax
business were husband and wife, consideration should be given to the
respective contributions of the parties of service and money to the busi-
ness. It was observed, however, that the Tax Court had never held
that the distributive shares of income should be allocated in accordance
to capital contributed where (1) there was a partnership recognized for
tax purposes and (2) there was adequate evidence that both the hus-
band and the wife had contributed something to the capital of the busi-
ness or had made contributions to services, or both. In L. C. Binford,
T. C. Memo. Op., Dkt. 4386 (June 18, 1945) the taxpayer, the sole owner
of a night club, executed a deed which conveyed one-half of the interest
of the real estate used in operating the business to his wife. Concur-
rently, representations were made by the taxpayer to his brother, his
secretary and his attorney that the wife had a one-half interest in the
business. The Tax Court held that no absolute gift of a one-half inter-
est in the business had been made by the taxpayer, and that as a result
no partnership existed between the spouses. It was recognized, how-
ever, that the wife owned one-half of the real estate used by the busi-
ness. Based on a fair market value of the realty at the date of the gift,
the Tax Court determined a rental for the property, and one-half of that
sum was allocated to the wife as her separate income.
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litigation," it becomes necessary to emphasize at this point
that the common theme in the family partnership cases
makes an orderly presentation of fact of paramount im-
portance in that type of litigation. For this reason, every
practitioner who is faced with the trial of a family part-
nership case should be well grounded in the type and
character of evidence which is best calculated to result
in an ultimate finding in favor of his client.
Before a trial lawyer can present the facts of his case
in an orderly fashion, he must be fully apprised of the
basic and underlying legal issues at stake. In family part-
nership cases, the ultimate issue is to whom certain in-
come should be taxed. In refusing to accept a return as
filed by adding to the income there reported additional
inconke which had been reported by a third person, the
Commissioner in effect contends that the unincluded item
is owned by and should be reported by the taxpayer. The
burden of proof then falls upon the taxpayer to disclaim
ownership of the unreported item, and this he does by
attempting to establish that the income in question is
7 This is of course emphasized by Dobson v. Commissioner, 320 U. S.
489 (1943). As to whether the Dobson case merely reiterated the finalty
of the fact-finding powers of the Tax Court, or went one step further
by giving a presumptive correctness to its rulings on questions of law,
see: Paul, Dobson v. Commissioner: The strange Ways of Law and Fact
(1944) 57 Harv. L. Rev. However, the recent decision in Bingham's Trust
v. Commissioner, 65 S. Ct. 1232 (U. S. 1945), is at least an indication that
Internal Revenue Code §1141 (c) (1) does not make the Tax Court the
final arbiter of the issue of whether or not its own decisions on ques-
tions of law are right or wrong. It would thus seem clear that if the
Circuit Courts of Appeals accept the findings of fact made by the Tax
Court, they are free to reverse on any mistaken application of law. The
Tax Court, in a number of recent family partnership cases, has included
in its finding of fact conclusions to the effect that the parties did or
did not create a firm which would be recognized for tax purposes. Murphy
Shannon Armstrong, 1 T. C. 1008 (1943); Irwin J. Miller, T. C. Memo.
Op., Dkt. 2272 (Oct. 9, 1944); George A. Croft, T. C. Memo. Op. Dkt.
1432 (Oct. 11, 1944) ; M. W. Turner et al., T. C. Memo. Op., Dkts. 2460,
2461 (Nov. 30, 1944). This practice has been condemned by taxpayers
who have contended that such findings go to the root of the case and
could only have been intended to preclude an appeal to the Circuit Courts
of Appeals. Brief for Petitioners, p. 76, Armstrong v. Commissioner,
143 F. (2d) 700 (C. C. A. 10th, 1944). Because many family partnership
cases are capable of disposition on appeal on the authority of the Dobson
case, it would seem that this objection has some merit. Cases which have
been affirmed on authority of Dobson v. Commissioner, are: Lorenz v.
Commissioner, 148 F. (2d) 527 (C. C. A. 6th, 1945) ; Lusthaus v. Commis-
sioner, 149 F. (2d) 232 (C. C. A. 3rd, 1945) ; Supornick v. Commissioner,
150 F. (2d) 110 (C. C. A. 8th, 1945) ; Miller v. Commissioner, 150 F. (2d)
823 (C. C. A. 2nd, 1945).
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owned by a third person. To shift this incidence of owner-
ship, the taxpayer relies upon the existence of a legal
status, the partnership, and attempts to prove that a third
party, a member of his family, is a member of that part-
nership. To meet the taxpayer's argument, the Commis-
sioner joins issue on the existence of the partnership status
for tax purposes, and contends that the formal relationship
between the parties is merely an attempt to reallocate
income within a family unit.
No one fact is ever taken as conclusive of the existence
of a family partnership status. The ultimate conclusion
can only be reached after a careful weighing of all the
evidence and a thoughtful consideration of all the testi-
mony. Such intangible factors as the demeanor of the
taxpayer's witnesses on the stand may be given consid-
eration. Indeed, it has been suggested that what would
be sufficient evidence to satisfy one judge would not be
sufficient to satisfy another.8 0 The undertone of the entire
proceeding may have its effect. Cases illustrate the point,
for instance, that if a hearing is conducted throughout with
a freedom from suggestion that personal tax avoidance
has motivated the formation of the partnership, less actual
evidence is required to prove the partnership status than
where tax-conscious persons are brought to account."'
Chief among the evidential prerequisites in any family
partnership case is proof of the actual agreement which
existed between the taxpayer and the members of his
family. 2 Since the best evidence of the existence of such
an agreement is a written instrument which incorporates
its terms, it is not surprising to find that the decisions have
SO Paul, Partnerships in Tax Avoidance (1945) 13 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 121.
81 Compare the case of J. G. Fredeking, T. C. Memo. Op., Dkt. 110082 (Oct.
21, 1943), in which the Court refused to sanction a family partnership
although enough "technical" evidence was in the record, with Benjamin
Shander, T. C. Memo. Op., Dkt. 111788 (March 11, 1943), where no personal
tax saving motive was developed, but where the parties produced a smaller
degree of formal evidence than is usually required.
11 It is fundamental that the contract between the parties must be a
"partnership" agreement. Where, for instance, the agreement is entered
into for the purposes of settling accounts between members of a family,
no partnership has been formed, even though the amount of money a
member of the family was to receive was measured or determined by
the earnings of a family business. Frank S. Delp, T. C. Memo. Op.,
Dkt. 110120 (May 12, 1943).
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at times emphasized the weight to be accorded written
articles of partnership. Perhaps it is safe to generalize
that in some of the earlier cases decided by the Board
upholding the existence of family partnerships, the pres-
ence of a written agreement received more emphasis than
would be accorded to it today.85 In at least two series of
litigations, the Board refused to recognize the existence
of family partnerships when the only proof consisted of
oral statements of the taxpayer's witnesses; but in later
cases, involving the same partnerships, the status was given
recognition on the strength of written articles which had
not been considered in the earlier proceedings! 4 More
recently, the Tax Court has indicated that it was still will-
ing to consider the presence of a written agreement as an
important evidentiary factor in sustaining a family part-
nership.8 5
Although given considerable weight as proof of the exist-
ence of a family partnership, the presence of a written agree-
ment is never considered to be conclusive that the status
exists.8 6 This is especially true in those situations in which
a partnership derives all or most of its income from the
personal services of the taxpayer.8 7 In such cases, it is a
88R. A. Bartley, 4 B. T. A. 874 (1926); L. S. Cobb, 9 B. T. A. 547,
(1927) ; E. L. Kier, 15 B. T. A. 1114 (1929) ; R. E. Hinshaw, 16 B. T. A.
1236 (1929).
" In G. M. Harrington, 10 B. T. A. 92 (1928), the Board stated that
the taxpayer was required to introduce evidence to overcome the pre-
sumptive correctness of the Commissioner's determination, and that in
its opinion no such evidence had been introduced to establish the part-
nership relationship between the taxpayer and his wife. However, in
Glenn M. Harrington, 21 B. T. A. 260 (1930), the same taxpayer, on
exactly the same facts as he had introduced in the previous case, with
the addition thereto of a written agreement of partnership, was success-
ful in establishing the partnership status. To the same effect, compare
J. Howard Coombs, 20 B. T. A. 1021 (1930) with Elizabeth M. Coombs
et al., 25 B. T. A. 1320 (1932).
15 M. W. Smith, 3 T. C. 894 (1944). Here both the gift of capital by
the husband to the wife and the partnership agreement were in writing.
16 Samuel J. Lidov, 16 B. T. A. 1421 (1929) ; T. L. Talley, 22 B. T. A.
712 (1931); Harry C. Fisher, 29 B. T. A. 1041 (1934) Affd per curiam
Fisher v. Commissioner, 74 F. (2d) 1014 (C. C. A. 2nd, 1935) ; Thomas M.
McIntyre, 37 B. T. A. 812 (1938); Frank J. Lorenz, 3 T. C. 746 (1944)
Aff'd per curi m Lorenz v. Commissioner, 148 F. (2d) 527 (C. C. A. 6th,
1945) ; Carl P. Munter et al., 5 T. C. , No. 6 (1945) ; George M. Hen-
derson Est., B. T. A. Memo. Op., Dkt. 105615 (Dec. 13, 1941).
87 Harry C. Fisher, 29 B. T. A. 1041 (1934) Aff' per curmn Fisher v.
Commissioner, 74 F. (2d) 1014 (C. C. A. 2nd, 1935); Thomas M. McIn-
tyre, 37 B. T. A. 812 (1938) ; Ernest R. J. Waldburger, B. T. A. Memo.
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cardinal rule that the mere fact that the taxpayer and
his wife have entered into a formal agreement of partner-
ship is not of itself sufficient to entitle them to divide for
tax purposes what would otherwise be the taxpayer's in-
come.ss Moreover, it is entirely possible that a written
agreement between the members of a family may of itself
disprove the existence of a partnership. In at least one
case, the Board has refused to look beyond a written agree-
ment where its terms were in conflict with the claim that
a family partnership had been created, even though the
taxpayer contended that he had produced other facts
which proved the existence of the status. 9
If a written partnership agreement is considered to
be persuasive evidence that a family partnership status
exists, the question remains as to whether or not the ab-
sence of such an agreement will be fatal in a given case.
A considerable number of early decisions held that family
partnerships existed even though there was no written
agreement between the parties.9" The principal effect of
the absence of such an agreement was held to be the plac-
ing of a higher burden of proof upon the taxpayer.9 How-
ever, the majority of these cases arose before the family
partnership device became a popular form of tax avoid-
ance, and it would seem that they are of little more than
academic importance today. This is explained by the fact
that with the realization of the continued close scrutiny
Op., Dkt. 103444 (Sept. 30, 1941) AfJ d per curiam Waldburger v. Commis-
sioner, 131 F. (2d) 598 (C. C. A. 2nd, 1942); Edward J. Miller, T. C.
Memo. Op., Dkt. 3300 (March 18, 1944).
8 Ernest R. J. Waldburger, B. T. A. Memo. Op., Dkt. 103444 (Sept. 30,
1941) Aff d per curiam Waldburger v. Commissioner, 131 F. (2d) 598
(C. C. A. 2nd, 1942).
s9 George M. Henderson Est., B. T. A. Memo. Op., Dkt. 105615 (Dec.
13, 1941).
80 Nancy J. Ryman et al., 5 B. T. A. 1288 (1927) ; M. L. Virden, 6 B.
T. A. 1123 (1927); Thomas F. Kelley, 9 B. T. A. 834 (1927) ; Plihu
Clement Wilson, 11 B. T. A. 963 (1928); H. T. Loper, 12 B. T. A. 164
(1928) ; R. C. McKnight, 13 B. T. A. 885 (1928); B. M. Phelps, 13 B. T. A.
1248 (1928); John Peters, 16 B. T. A. 895 (1929) ; John T. Newell, 17
B. T. A. 93 (1929) ; W. H. Simmons, 22 B. T. A. 1106 (1931); Leonard
M. Gunderson, 23 B. T. A. 45 (1931); J. Kammerdiner, 25 B. T. A.
495 (1932) ; Charles Tufft, 25 B. T. A. 986 (1932) (Although no technical
partnership status recognized under Massachusetts law) ; Walter W. Moyer,
35 B. T. A. 1155 (1937).
81 Max Roth, 7 B. T. A. 628 (1927) (Partnership not recognized) ; J.
W. Brackman, 24 B. T. A. 259 (1931) (Burden of proof met).
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which will be given to all family partnerships, parties will
in all probability reduce their understandings to writing
in the hope that the partnership will be given a better
chance of recognition for tax purposes.
The rule which requires the taxpayer to show the exist-
ence of a family partnership status by a preponderance
of evidence is supplemented by the corollary that the
mere showing of an intent to form a partnership will not
carry the burden of proof. 92 This is true even although
a declaration of such intention is filed with a State official. 9
If the facts establish that the taxpayer had no intention
of relinquishing his control over any part of the family
business by an agreement which purportedly formed a
partnership, the firm will not be recognized. 94 The Tax
Court has held that the intention to give family members
a share in a business conditioned upon their continued in-
terest and enthusiasm in the affairs of the concern is not
sufficient to prove the existence of a family partnership.95
While testimony proving the intention of a party to form
a family partnership may have some weight in proving
that the intent was actually acted upon, it is necessary
to show by the conduct of the parties that the intention
to form the partnership was consummated by actual organ-
ization.
Documentary evidence is not the only type of proof
which can be drawn upon to show that the parties in-
tended to create a partnership status. For instance, the
desire of an individual to lessen his participation in busi-
ness and to bring in a member of his family to carry part
of the burden is evidence that a bona fide partnership was
92 James H. Persons, 5 B. T. A. 716 (1926); John W. Graham, 8 B.
T. A. 1081 (1927) (No intention proved) ; William D. Hutchins. 14 B. T. A.
421 (1928) ; James L. Robertson, 20 B. T. A. 112 (1930) ; Ed Kasch et
al., 25 B. T. A. 284 (1932) Aff'd Kasch v. Commissioner, 63 F. (2d) 466
(C. C. A. 5th, 1933) Cert. denied 290 U. S. 644 (1933) ; Joseph Supornick,
T. C. Memo. Op., Dkt. 356 (Nov. 13, 1943) Aff'd Supornick v. Commissioner,
150 F. (2d) 110 (C. C. A. 8th, 1945).
13 W. A. Felton, 18 B. T. A. 63 (1929).
91 Ed Kasch et al., 25 B. T. A. 284 (1932) Aff'd Kasch v. Commissioner,
63 F. (2d) 466 (C. C. A. 5th, 1933) Cert. denied 290 U. S. 644 (1933).
"5Joseph Supornick, T. C. Memo. Op., Dkt. 356 (Nov. 13, 1943) Aff'd
Supornick v. Commissioner, 150 F. (2d) 110 (C. C. A. 8th, 1945).
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created.96 Moreover, proof that each member of the fam-
ily had a thorough understanding of the business will be
helpful in establishing the validity of the firm for tax
purposesY7 Of equal importance, in those cases involving
more than one family, is the acceptance by the non-family
members of the new partner, and the recognition of his
status as a member of the partnership.9"
Certain types of evidence extrinsic to the partnership
itself are of utmost importance in proving the valid exist-
91W. A. Billingrath, 3 B. T. A. 11 (1925); Frank E. Eyestone, 12
B. T. A. 1232 (1928) ; Charles W. Crane, 19 B. T. A. 577 (1930) ; J. D.
Johnston, Jr., 3 T. C. 799 (1944) ; M. W. Turner et al., T. C. Memo. Op.,
Dkts. 2460, 2461 (Nov. 30, 1944). However, the mere fact that the tax-
payer has become partially disabled and wishes to give his wife an in-
terest in his business will not of itself prove the existence of a family
partnership. There must, in addition, be acts and conduct to show that
the desire was carried out and that a partnership was actually formed.
Julius Goldenberg, 5 B. T. A. 213 (1926). See also Irwin J. Miller, T. C.
Memo. Op., Dkt. 2272 (Oct. 9, 1944) Affid per euriam Miller v. Commis-
sioner, 150 F. (2d) 823 (C. C. A. 2nd, 1945), in which the taxpayer as-
signed his interest in a partnership which was composed of the tax-
payer and his father, to his wife, who was in poor health. After the
assignment, the wife contributed no services to the firm, had no drawing
account, and used the firm profits which were given to her to defray
household expenses. The Tax Court held that no valid partnership
had been created. Conflicting results have been reached where the fam-
ily member has been made a partner for other business reasons. Thus,
in Benjamin Shander, T. C. Memo. Op., Dkt. 111788 (March 11, 1943), a
family partnership was formed primarily because a bank refused to lend
money to the business which, up to that time, had been conducted as
a sole proprietorship. The ground for the bank's refusal was the age
of the sole proprietor, and it was insisted that a partnership be formed
which would include the taxpayer's sons. The partnership status was
recognized. However, in E. C. Ellery, 4 T. C. 407 (1944), a partnerhip
was not recognized where the taxpayer made his wife a partner in order
that the wife, who had been employed in the business, could deal more
freely with customers of the firm. The decision seemingly rests upon the
ground that the gift of the firm interest was invalid, since it was condi-
tioned upon the formation of a partnership whose business would have
been illegal under state law.
" Sidney M. Harvey, B. T. A. Memo. Op., Dkt. 109298 (Oct. 14, 1942);
Sidney M. Harvey, T. C. Memo. Op., Dkt. 1056 (Sept. 27, 1944) ; M. W.
Turner et al., T. C. Memo. Op., Dkts. 2460, 2461 (Nov. 30, 1944). The
fact that the family member who is made a member of a family partnership
knows nothing of the business activities of the firm is evidence point-
ing to the result that the parties have merely attempted to reallocate
income within the family unit. Joseph W. Grant et al., T. C. Memo.
Op., Dkts. 407, 416 (Aug. 3, 1944) AJJ'd Grant v. Commissioner, 150 F.
(2d) 915 (C. C. A. 10th, 1945).
11 Rose v. Commissioner, 65 F. (2d) 616 (C. C. A. 6th, 1933); W. A.
Bellingrath, 3 B. T. A. 11 (1925) ; Harry P. Kelley, 9 B. T. A. 832 (1927) ;
J. E. Biggs, Sr., 15 B. T. A. 1092 (1929) ; Charles W. Crane, 19 B. T. A.
577 (1930) ; Jasper Sipes, 31 B. T. A. 709 (1934). Where the non-family
partner does not know of the presence of the new partner, or refuses to
accept him as such, the partnership status will not be recognized. Hous-
ton Brothers, 22 B. T. A. 51 (1931) ; George W. Balkwill, 25 B. T. A. 1147
(1932) AffJd Balkwill v. Commissioner, 77 F. (2d) 569 (C. C. A. 6th,
1935) Cert. denied 296 U. S. 609 (1935).
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ence of the firm. By all odds, the most persuasive evi-
dence of this character is a showing that the enterprise
was known to be conducted as a partnership by those who
dealt with it in a business way. With but few exceptions,99
the cases have uniformly held that knowledge on the part
of banks, customers, salesmen and the trade in general
that members of a family were conducting their business
as a partnership will be given substantial weight in de-
termining the valid existence of the firm.' The same is
true with respect to similar knowledge on the part of busi-
ness associates'' and credit rating institutions.0 2 The fact
that a contract entered into by the partnership with third
persons and the bond which secured it had been signed by
all the members of the family as principals has been held
to be evidence tending to prove that a family partnership
has been organized. 0 3  A similar effect has been given
to a general reputation in the community that the family
business was being conducted as a partnership. 10 4  How-
ever, where the taxpayer has made statements to third
parties for non-business reasons to the effect that his busi-
ness was being conducted by a family partnership, the
knowledge of such persons is of little or no value to prove
the valid existence of the firm.' Moreover, if the tax-
payer is unable to show that any third person knew of
the existence of the firm, his chances for a decision which
would recognize its existence for tax purposes are negli-
gible.' Related to this type of proof is evidence showing
that the interest of a family member in a partnership is
09 R. A. Bartley, 4 B. T. A. 874 (1926) ; James 0. Peterson, T. C. Memo
Op., Dkt. 251 (Nov. 30, 1943).
10 H. T. Loper, 12 B. T. A. 164 (1928); John T. Newell, 17 B. T. A.
93 (1929) ; W. H. Simmons, 22 B. T. A. 1106 (1931)-; Albert G. Dickin-
son, 23 B. T. A. 1212 (1931); J. W. Brackman, 24 B. T. A. 259 (1931);
Richard H. Oakley, 24 B. T. A. 1082 (1931) ; J. Kammerdiner. 25 B. T. A.
495 (1932).
101 Nancy J. Ryman, et al., 5 B. T. A. 1288 (1927); Leonard M. Gun-
derson, 23 B. T. A. 45 (1931).
102 M. L. Virden, 6 B. T. A. 1123 (1927). But see M. A. Long, 8 B. T. A.
737 (1927), where notice to the same institution was deemed insufficient.
103 Montgomery v. Thomas, 146 F. (2d) 76 (C. C. A. 5th, 1944).
104 R. C. McKnight, 13 B. T. A. 885 (1928).
10 James L. Robertson, 20 B. T. A. 112 (1930).
100 Julius Goldenberg, 5 B. T. A. 213 (1926) ; W. A. Felton, 18 B. T. A.
63 (1929) ; Thomas M. McIntyre, 37 B. T. A. 812 (1938); Joseph W. Grant
et al., T. C. Memo. Op., Dkts. 407, 416 (Aug. 3, 1944) Aff'd Grant v. Com-
missioner, 150 F. (2d) 915 (C. C. A. 10th, 1945).
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recognized after a dissolution of the firm. Thus a showing
that the family business was incorporated and that each
member of the family received stock in proportion to his
former interest in the firm is helpful in proving that a
bona fide family partnership had been created.
10 7
Although not considered determinative as a matter of
law,' decisions of state courts to the effect that members
of a family were conducting business on a partnership
basis are given some consideration as evidence tending to
prove the existence of the firm for tax purposes.109 Local
state statutes raising presumptions in favor of the exist-
ence of partnerships have also been given some weight in
tax cases."0 It would seem to be the better view, however,
that such statutes together with statements filed with state
officials which designate a business as a partnership are
of no value as proof that the firm was substantive in char-
acter, and this type of evidence should be ignored by the
courts."'
In the trial of a case, the weight to be accorded any
evidence is conditioned to some extent upon the person-
ality of the witness who introduces it. Family partner-
ship cases are no exception. The Board, in several cases,
has stated that the uncorroborated and self-serving state-
ments of a taxpayer made at the hearing to the effect that
his business was carried on as a family partnership were
not sufficient to prove the valid existence of the firm."12
The same rule has been reiterated by the Tax Court."3
'Justin Potter, 47 B. T. A. 607 (1942).
10s See infra, pp. 207 to 211 for a full discussion of this point.
1*0 Irene McCullough et al., T. C. Memo. Op., Dkts. 1710, 1711 (July
19, 1944) ; George A. Croft, T. C. Memo. Op., Dkt. 1432 (Oct. 11, 1944).
"(I Elihu Clement Wilson, 11 B. T. A. 963 (1928); W. H. Simmons, 22
B. T. A. 1106 (1931).
"I Local statutes raising presumptions that a partnership exists are, for
the most part, intended to protect creditors of the firm, and hence have
no bearing on their tax status. Declarations filed with state officials
under "Fictitious Name" statutes are, in reality, no more than the tax-
payer's own statements that a family partnership exists, and are of no
importance for the purposes of the income tax law. See James 0. Peter-
son, T. C. Memo. Op., Dkt. 251 (Nov. 30, 1943).
11:2W. A. Felton, 18 B. T. A. 63 (1929); James L. Robertson, 20 B.
T. A. 112 (1930) ; W. M. Buchanan, 20 B. T. A. 210 (1930) ; Cf. Charles
G. Black, 39 B. T. A. 1068, 1071 (1939) Rev'd Black v. Commissioner,
114 F. (2d) 355 (C. C. A. 9th, 1940).
118 Stanley Bradshaw, T. C. Memo. Op., Dkt. 334 (July 31, 1944) AffTd
Bradshaw v. Commissioner, 150 F. (2d) 918 (C. C. A. 10th, 1945).
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It is uncertain at the present time whether or not the
uncorroborated testimony of a taxpayer's wife or child
or a member of his family carries a similar disability. In
at least one case, the Tax Court, two judges dissenting,
sustained the existence of a family partnership for tax
purposes, even though the major part of the evidence had
been supplied by the taxpayer's wife." 4
A number of cases have contained statements to the
effect that a family partnership will be disregarded if it
appears from the evidence that the parties intended to
avoid taxes by means of the organization of the firm.115
A possible inference from such statements is that the in-
tention of the parties is an important factor in the de-
termination of whether or not a partnership will be recog-
nized for tax purposes."' Actually, this is not the case.
The reason for this lies in the fact that the tests which
must be met before a firm will be disregarded taxwise
are based upon what the parties have done, as distinguished
from what they believe they have accomplished. The de-
cisions have inferred, for instance, that even though the
testimony of a taxpayer to the effect that he had no in-
tention of avoiding taxes in creating his partnership is
"
4 Felix Zukaitis, 3 T. C. 814 (1944).
115Tinkoff v. Commissioner, 120 F. (2d) 564 (C. C. A. 7th, 1941) Cert.
denied 314 U. S. 581 (1941) ; A. R. Losh, 1 T. C. 1019 (1943) Aff'd Losh
et al. v. Commissioner, 145 F. (2d) 456 (C. C. A. 10th, 1944) ; Francis
Doll, 2 T. C. 276 (1943) Aff'd Doll v. Commissioner, 149 F. (2d) 239 (C.
C. A. 8th, 1945) Cert. applied June 19, 1945; A. L. Lusthaus, 3 T. C. 540
(1944) Affd Lusthaus v. Commissioner, 149 F. (2d) 232 (C. C. A. 3rd,
1945); 0. William Lowry, 3 T. C. 730 (1944) On appeal, Circuit Court,
Sixth Circuit; M. M. Argo, 3 T. C. 1120 (1944) Aff'd on other grounds
Argo v. Commissioner, 150 F. (2d) 67 (C. C. A. 5th, 1945) ; B. A. Schro-
der, B. T. A. Memo. Op., Dkt. 108729 (June 23, 1942) Aff'd Schroder v.
Commissioner, 134 F. (2d) 346 (C. C. A. 5th, 1943).
1 Seizing upon this inference, taxpayers have attempted to have their
partnerships recognized for tax purposes by introducing evidence that
the parties had no intention to avoid taxes when the firm was organ-
ized. Lewis H. Singletary, 5 T. C. , No. 42. Proof of intention may
be made in two principal ways. The first is by means of introducing
the testimony of the taxpayer with respect to his motives. However,
since such testimony has been given little if any probative weight in
determining other facts in partnership cases, supra n. 112, it is not sur-
prising to find that it is regarded as of no value in proving intention.
The second method of proving intention is by showing conduct which
relates to it. But proof of such conduct will also establish the facts which
must be present before a family partnership will be recognized for tax
purposes. It follows, therefore, that while proof of conduct may in a
given case prove intention, it will also establish the validity of the firm,
and as a result intention, as such, becomes unimportant.
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admitted to be true, the firm will be disregarded if there
is insufficient evidence of conduct to comply with the ac-
cepted requirements. 117 It follows, therefore, that the con-
duct of the parties is the controlling factor in each case.
Moreover, there should be no particular quarrel with this
result, in view of the fact that the question of intention
is at best an extremely difficult element of proof, and be-
cause experience has shown that results have been far
from satisfactory in other fields of tax law in which the
criterion of liability has depended upon the intention of
the taxpayer.'
A family partnership which derives the major part
of its income from the use of capital" 9 will not be recog-
.17 A recent dictum by the Tax Court in Lewis H. Singletary, 5 T. C.
, No. 42, indicates that motive is neutral. In that case, the taxpayer
had given an interest in his gasoline business to his wife, and at a later
date had given an interest in the same business to his mother and father.
Both the taxpayer and his wife testified that tax saving had not ani-
mated him, or them, in the making of the gifts. The Court, holding
the taxpayer had failed to show that the income from the business did
not belong in toto to him, disregarded the partnership. The opinion is
confusing. It seemingly relies both upon the fact that the business was
largely personal in its nature, making the ownership of capital unim-
portant, and upon the fact that no assets were in reality given or sold
by the taxpayer to members of his family. However, the ultimate result
reached in the case, namely, that the taxpayer had failed to meet the
burden of proof cast upon him by the Commissioner's determination,
seems sound.
"18 The most flagrant example is, of course, the requirement of Int.
Rev. Code §811 (c) for the inclusion in the gross estate of any' interest
in property which a decedent has transferred in contemplation of death.
It has been suggested that although this section has been in effect for
almost thirty years, and has been considered by a great number of cases,
its meaning is still so unsettled as to produce contrary results in almost
identical fact patterns. Pavenstedt, Taxation of Transfers in Contempla-
tion of Death: A Proposal for Abolition (1944), 54 Yale L. J. 70. One
of the principal obstacles in this section, and the Regulations which have
attempted to construe it, is that tax liability has been made to turn on
motives which caused certain operative acts to occur, rather than on
the occurrence of the acts themselves.
119 The fact that capital is an important element in the production of
income must be proved. As stated at another point in this paper, sev-
eral methods of approach may be used in this respect, but it should be
remembered that in each of them the taxpayer has the burden of proof.
For instance, if it appeared that an individual was earning certain com-
missions on the sale of products without owning any of the equipment
needed in making deliveries, and if it further appeared that he subse-
quently purchased such equipment and formed a family partnership, the
burden would fall upon the taxpayer to show the importance of the new
capital to the business. The Tax Court has held, in such a case, that
the receipt by a partnership of substantially the same amount of profits
as was received by the individual at a time when he was admittedly con-
ducting a personal service business would tend to prove that capital was
unimportant. D. H. McEachern, 5 T. C. , No. 4 (1945).
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nized unless it can be shown that each partner contrib-
uted services or capital owned by him to the firm. In
such cases, where the existence of the firm is rested solely
upon the contention that capital has been contributed by
a member of the family, the amount of property supplied
by a member of the family must be shown with some de-
gree of accuracy; and it must also be proved that the assets
were contributed as a partner.' 20  Moreover, an indispens-
able element of proof in such cases is that the capital was
the property of the contributor and not that of another
member of the same family group. Proof of the owner-
ship of such assets may be drawn from a variety of sources.
For instance, book entries which are not fictitious' 2 ' and
which clearly reflect the interest of a family member as
a member of the family partnership are given some
weight.'22 On the other hand, the mere showing that the
name of the wife or son of a taxpayer appears on the firm
books as a partner will not, standing alone, be sufficient
to establish the independent ownership of part of the firm
assets by such persons.1 23  However, the absence of book
entries is not fatal. In several cases, the Board has clearly
120 Penziner v. United States, 54 F. Supp. 842 (N. D. Calif., 1944).
121 In Blalock v. Allen, 56 F., Supp. 266 (M. D. Ga., 1944), the Court re-
fused to recognize a partnership in which an interest had been sold to
the taxpayer's aged father. Although the shares owned by each part-
ner were clearly reflected on the books of the firm, the entries were re-
garded as fictitious and were therefore given no weight.
122 For cases in which no book entries could be produced showing the
interest of the members of the family other than the taxpayer and where
the partnership was accordingly not recognized for tax purposes, see:
Julius Goldenberg, 5 B. T. A. 213 (1926); Hudson M. Knapp, 5 B. T. A.
762 (1926). In Dawes v. Allen, F. Supp. (M. D. Ga., 1945)
the Court relied on book entries which showed that the taxpayer was
the sole owner of the assets of a business in refusing to recognize a fam-
ily partnership even though the taxpayer's father had made advances to
firm capital. In the following cases, book entries were held to be pur-
suasive evidence of ownership by members of a family of assets em-
ployed by a family partnership: M. L. Virden, 6 B. T. A. 1123 (1927);
Walter W. Moyer, 35 B. T. A. 1155 (1937) ; J. D. Johnston, Jr., 3 T. C.
799 (1944); R. C. Bennett, B. T. A. Memo. Op., Dkt. 101715 (Sept. 2,
1941). See also Arthur Stryker, 17 B. T. A. 1033 (1929) ; Albert G. Dick-
inson, 23 B. T. A. 1212 (1931), where no technical partnership was found
to exist due to the fact that under state law such relationships were
not recognized between husband and wife. However, book entries were
relied upon to show that income was derived from capital which was
separately owned by the wife, and this income was accordingly held to
be not taxable to the husband.
128 Ed Kasch et al., 25 B. T. A. 284 (1932) Affd Kasch v. Commissioner,
63 F. (2d) 466 (C. C. A. 5th, 1933) Cert. denied 290 U. S. 644 (1933) ; S.
M. 4277, IV-2 CuM. BULL. 58 (1925).
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stated that the absence of accounts in the name of a family
member is merely evidentiary, and has sustained the part-
nership for tax purposes even though the taxpayer was
unable to show that the family member was recognized
as a member of the firm on its books. 124
Connected with the weight to be given to book entries
in family partnership cases is the evidentiary emphasis
to be placed on the right of all partners to require that
their distributive share of firm income be paid to them
at established intervals. While not absolutely essential
to the validity of a family partnership, 125 the presence in
the firm agreement of the right of each partner to with-
draw his share of firm profits as he chooses is taken as
strong indication that he owned part of the firm assets.
In numerous cases, the Board and Tax Court have empha-
sized the presence of a right of withdrawal as one of the
elements which tend to sustain a family partnership for
tax purposes. 126  The right to draw checks in the name
of the firm similarly has been accorded some weight. 127
Conversely, the absence of withdrawal privileges or the
retention of an unfettered power .to withdraw firm profits
by the head of the family has been held to be strong indi-
cation that no independent capital had been contributed
by each member of a family, and, as a result, that no
family partnership had been created. 28 In this connection,
124 h'. L. Kier, 15 B. T. A. 1114 (1929); John T. Newell, 17 B. T. A.
93 (1929); Leonard M. Gunderson, 23 B. T. A. 45 (1931). Of. Charles
Tifft, 25 B. T. A. 986 (1932) (No technical partnership recognized under
Massachusetts law).
125 Millard D. Olds, 15 B. T. A. 560 (1929) Aff'd Commissioner v. Olds,
60 F. (2d) 252 (C. C. A. 6th, 1932); E. L. Kier, 15 B. T. A. 1114 (1929);
Irene McCullough et al., T. C. Memo. Op., Dkts. 1710, 1711 (July 19, 1944).
120 R. A. Bartley, 4 B. T. A. 874 (1926); Nancy J. Ryman et al., 5 B.
T. A. 1288 (1927); J. D. Johnston, Jr., 3 T. C. 799 (1944); M. W. Smith,
3 T. C. 894 (1944).
127 J. D. Johnston, Jr., 3 T. C. 799 (1944); Davis B. Thornton, 5 T. C.
, No. 13 (1945). In Hodgson v. Willingham, F. Supp. (M. D.
Ala., 1945), the absence of this power was considered important in de-
termining that a wife was not the business partner of her husband.
See also Blalock v. Allen, 56 F. Supp. 266 (M. D. Ga., 1944).
128 Harry C. Fisher, 29 B. T. A. 1041 (1934) Aff'd per curium Fisher v.
Commissioner, 74 F. (2d) 1014 (C. C. A. 2nd, 1935); Frank J. Lorenz,
3 T. C. 746 (1944) Affd per curialm Lorenz v. Commissioner, 148 F. (2d)
527 (C. C. A. 6th, 1945) ; A. M. Mead, B. T. A. Memo. Op., Dkt. 108837
(April 2, 1942); B. A. Schroder, B. T. A. Memo. Op., Dkt. 108729 (June
23, 1942) Aff'd Schroder v. Commissioner, 134 F. (2d) 346 (C. C. A. 5th,
1943); Stanley Bradshaw, T. C. Memo. Op., Dkt. 334 (July 31, 1944)
Aff'd Bradshaw v. Commissioner, 150 F. (2d) 918 (C. C. A. 10th, 1945).
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the Tax Court 129 has emphasized the fact that a provision in
a partnership agreement giving a husband the sole power
of withdrawal coupled with a provision that one-half of
his withdrawals would be charged against his wife's capital
account, was sufficient evidence to justify the disregard
of the partnership for tax purposes. 3 °
Effect of Local Law.
The impact of local law on family partnership cases
has been felt in two principal ways. In the first place,
the decisions have, at times, pointed to local requirements
existing under state law in demonstrating that a family
partnership did or did not exist for tax purposes. In the
second place, some attention has been given, in recent
cases, to the fact that taxpayers have obtained declaratory
judgments from state courts to the effect that they were
conducting their business in partnership form. Neither
the fact that the members of a family have complied with
all requirements of local law, nor the existence of a local
court decree declaring the status between the parties to be
a partnership, should have any substantive bearing, how-
ever, on the question of whether or not the firm will be
recognized for tax purposes.13
Before the family partnership device became a popular
method of splitting surtaxes, the Board was content to de-
termine whether or not a firm had been created by matching
the activities of the parties with the requirements of the
129 Frank J. Lorenz, 3 T. C. 746 (1944) Aff1d per curiam Lorenz v.
Commissioner, 148 F. (2d) 527 (C. C. A. 6th, 1945).130 Actually, the Tax Court was content to place its decision on the
ground that the taxpayer had made no gift to his wife of the assets
which were purportedly contributed by her to the firm. Since the wife
contributed no services to the partnership, her status as a partner depended
on an ownership of firm assets. The Tax Court emphasized the fact
that the failure on the part of the taxpayer to relinquish dominion and
control over the subject matter of the purported gift by means of the
provision relating to drawing accounts indicated that no gift had been
made.
11 As pointed out, supra, n. 109, a decree which declares that the status
existing between members of a family is a partnership has been given
some evidentiary weight in tax cases. The following discussion, how-
ever, deals with the question of whether or not such decrees, or the
meeting of local law requirements, are binding as a matter of substan-




law of the state in which they lived.3 2 In this respect,
emphasis was placed upon state statutes which presumed
the existence of a partnership from the fact that a party
received a share of profits from a business, 133 and upon
state code provisions which did not make the contribu-
tion of capital a necessary factor in the creation of a firm.'
Using the same approach, the Bureau ruled on numerous
occasions that a partnership would be regarded for tax
purposes if a wife could enter into a contract with her
husband under provisions of the law of their domicile, 3 5
but held that no family partnership would be recognized
if the wife was unable to form such an agreement because
of the disabilities of local law.'36 Moreover, it was not un-
common at that early date for the Government to contend
that a husband and wife could not be partners for income
tax purposes because they were incapable of entering into
such a relationship by virtue of some local law provision.
However, these contentions were uniformly rejected if
the Board was satisfied that a wife had an interest in the
"2 W A. Bellingrath, 3 B. T. A. 11 (1925); H. J. Barton, 3 B. T. A.
1262 (1926) ; R. A. Bartley, 4 B. T. A- 874 (1926); R. C. McKnight, 13
B. T. A. 885 (1928); E. L. Kier, 15 B. T. A. 1114 (1929); J. Kammer-
diner, 25 B. T. A. 495 (1932).
183W. H. Simmons, 22 B. T. A. 1106 (1931). The Board rested its
decision on the presumption created by a provision of the Tennessee Code,
and on the ground that members of the family contributed some services
to the business, which required little if any capital.
134 Elihu Clement Wilson, 11 B. T. A. 963 (1928). This case should
not be followed today, principally because it was clearly proved that the
wives of the taxpayers contributed neither services nor capital to the
partnership. The Board, in sustaining the firm for tax purposes, took
the position that it was unnecessary to show such contributions under
the statutes relating to partnerships in California. The rule should be,
however, that such statutes are not binding on the courts in tax cases,
and they should be given no weight.
135 G. C. M. 450, V-2 CuM. BULL. 49 (1926) (Arkansas) ; I. T. 1744, II-
2 CuM. BuLL. 179 (1923) (California); S. M. 2963, IV-1 Cum. BULL.
171 (1929) (Colorado) ; G. C. M. 433, V-2 Cum. BULL. 177 (1926) (Con-
necticut) ; G. C. M. 3421, VII-1 Cum&. BULL. 106 (1928) (District of
Columbia) ; G. C. M. 2448, VI-2 CuM. BuLL. 69 (1927) (Florida, if the
wife had become a "free dealer") ; S. M. 5042, V-1 Cum. BuIL. 68 (1926)
(Georgia); I. T. 2321, V-2 Cum. BuLL. 52 (1926) (Iowa); I. T. 2240,
IV-2 CuM. BULL. 60 (1925) (Kansas); S. M. 4277, IV-2 CuM. BuLL.
58 (1925) (Minnesota, but firm not recognized because of lack of evi-
dence) ; S. R. 6998, V-1 Cum. BULL. 268 (1926) (Nebraska) ; G. C. M.
5761, VIII-1 Cum. BuLL. 109 (1929) (New York); G. C. M. 3034, VII
-1 CuM. BULL. 104 (1928) (North Carolina); S. M. 3391, IV-1 Cum.
BuLL. 42 (1925) (South Carolina).
186 . T. 1371, I-1 Cum. BuLL. 208 (1922) (Maine); S. R. 7199, V
-1 CuM. BuLL. 269 (1926) (Michigan); S. R. 2863, IV-1 Cum. BULL.
174 (1925) (Texas) ; S. M. 3917, IV-2 Cum. BuLL. 189 (1925) (Vermont).
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capital employed in her husband's business, the decisions
resting chiefly upon the ground that the income derived
from such capital was not owned by the husband.
18 7
Although there is some authority to the contrary, 13 the
rule undoubtedly should be to the effect that provisions
of local law have no bearing on the question of the exist-
ence of a family partnership for tax purposes.19  The rea-
son for this lies in the simple and often-repeated principle
"I These contentions were advanced with respect to taxpayers who lived
in Michigan. The Board has held that while husband and wife could not
be partners under the common law of that state, they could be consid-
ered members of a joint venture for tax purposes. L. F. Sunlin, 6 B. T.
A. 1232 (1927). Other cases involving residents of Michigan have re-
fused to tax a husband on income which was produced by capital owned
by his wife, even though that capital formed part of the assets of a family
business. Earle L. Crossman, 10 B. T. A. 248 (1928); Elmer Klise, 10
B. T. A. 1234 (1928) ; Albert Kahn, 14 B. T. A. 125 (1928) ; R. E. Wing,
17 B. T. A. 1028 (1929); Alfred T. Wagner, 17 B. T. A. 1030 (1929);
Albert G. Dickinson, 23 B. T. A. 1212 (1931) ; James 0. Peterson, T. C.
Memo. Op., Dkt. 251 (Nov. 30, 1943). Cases have also characterized
residents of Michigan as partners for tax purposes. Felix Zukaitis, 3
T. C. 814 (1944). It was not necessary, however, for a party living in
Michigan to own part of the partnership assets before he was consid-
ered a member of the firm. Contribution of services has been held to be
sufficient. James N. Purse, 27 B. T. A. 725 (1933). The rule which
obtains for residents of Michigan has been applied where the parties
live in Massachusetts. Warren MacPherson, 19 B. T. A. 651 (1930);
Charles Tifft, 25 B. T. A. 986 (1932). The same result has been reached
with respect to residents of New Jersey. Arthur Stryker, 17 B. T. A.
1033 (1929). Although a husband and wife could not enter into a legal
partnership in West Virginia, the fact that their respective rights could
be enforced in equity has been relied upon to sustain a family partner-
ship for tax purposes. J. E. Biggs, Sr., 15 B. T. A. 1092 (1929) ; J. W.
Brackman, 24 B. T. A. 259 (1931); Pugh v. United States, 48 F. (2d)
600 (S. D. W. Va., 1931).
13 In Champlin v. Commissioner, 71 F. (2d) 23 (C. C. A. 10th, 1934),
the Court, in reversing the Board's determination that no partnership
status existed between a husband and wife, held that the relationship
between the parties was to be determined by the laws of Oklahoma, and
that under that law the parties had formed a "mining partnership" which
should be recognized for tax purposes. Commissioner v. Tenney, 120 F.
(2d) 421 (C. C. A. 1st, 1941) contains strong dictum to the effect that
provisions of local law should control. There the wife agreed with her
husband to supply capital if he would contribute services to a stock
market trading venture. The parties further agreed to divide equally
the net profits and losses of the enterprise. The Court, apparently as-
suming that the parties intended to form a partnership, stated that the
insurmountable difficulty was that in Massachusetts a married woman was
incapable of making a contract of partnership with her husband. The part-
nership was disregarded. To the extent that these cases stand for the
proposition that local law provisions should control the question of
whether or not a partnership exists for tax purposes, it is believed that
they are bad law. See also E. C. Ellery, 4 T. C. 407, (1944), which re-
lies on the illegality of the partnership business as grounds for its dis-
regard.
189 M. M. Argo, 3 T. C. 1120 (1944) Aff'd on other grounds Argo v. Com-
missioner, 150 F. (2d) 67 (C. C. A. 5tb, 1945).
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that Federal taxes are meant to be uniform throughout
the country, and that it is only where Congress has selected
some provision of local law to control the incidence of
taxation that such provisions should be given any weight.
As pointed out above, Congress, instead of defining a part-
nership in terms of local law, has left the problem of char-
acterization for the most part in the hands of the courts.
It can hardly be questioned, therefore, that it was intended
that a uniform definition of a partnership should apply
for tax purposes, no matter where the taxpayer lives or
what the local law requirements of his home state may be.
Moreover, it takes no imagination to see that hopeless
chaos instead of uniformity would result if the varying
provisions of local law were relied upon to determine
whether or not a family partnership should be regarded
for the purposes of the income tax law. 140
If compliance by the parties with local law require-
ments relating to partnerships has no bearing on the ques-
tion of the existence of a family partnership, it should fol-
low that a decree passed by a state court which in effect
declares that those requirements have been met by a hus-
band and wife is of no importance. The cases have been
consistent in stating that such decrees are not binding
whether the partnership was 4 1 or was not recognized for
tax purposes. 42  This result has been reached even though
the Commissioner was made a party to the suit seeking
140 This is clearly illustrated by the rulings of the Bureau. In S. M.
2373, 111-2 Cum. BuLL. 169 (1924) it was held that under the law of
South Carolina a married woman had no power to enter into a contract
of partnership with her husband, and that as a result she could not enter
into such a partnership for income tax purposes. Subsequently, the Su-
preme Court of South Carolina held that a partnership between husband
and wife was permitted under Section 3761 of the South Carolina Code.
Faced with what appeared to be a change in local law, the Bureau -held
that its former ruling should be disregarded. S. M. 3391 IV-1 CuM. BULL.
42 (1925). Carrying this approach to its logical conclusion, it would fol-
low that every change in local law on the question of the power of a
husband and wife to enter into a partnership agreement would require
a corresponding change for Federal tax purposes.
141 In both Millard D. Olds, 15 B. T. A. 560 (1929) Aff'd Commissioner
v. Olds, 60 F. (2d) 252 (C. C. A. 6th, 1932) and George A. Croft, T. C.
Memo. Op., Dkt. 1432 (Oct. 11, 1944), a suit was brought in the state
court which sought a declaratory decree after the taxpayer had received
his deficiency notice.
142 Doll v. Commissioner, 149 F. (2d) 239 (C. C. A. 8th, 1945) Cert. Ap-
plied, June 19, 1945; Frank J. Lorenz, 3 T. C. 746 (1944) Aff'd per curiam
Lorenz v. Commissioner, 148 F. (2d) 527 (C. C. A. 6th, 1945).
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the declaratory decree,143 and in those cases in which the
declaratory decree was sought before the Government's
claim for additional taxes was made known to the tax-
'payer.144  Moreover, in cases in which the declaratory
decree was sought after the taxpayer was aware of the
Government's position with respect to a family partner-
ship, it is not unusual to find such proceeding branded as
"collusive", 145 and in all probability the taxpayer was the
worse off for having initiated such litigation.
The Effect of the Clifford and Stuart Cases.
Any opinion by the Supreme Court bearing upon the
tax consequences of an attempted reallocation of income
within a family group 146 would in theory cut across the
question of to whom income from a family partnership
should be taxed. It is not surprising to find, therefore,
that the most important recent decision in this field, Hel-
vering v. Clifford,14' has played its part as a touchstone
in many of the cases which have considered the family
partnership problem. The often told story of the Clifford
case will not be repeated here.14  It is sufficient to say
143 Wilson v. Wilson, 141 F. (2d) 599 (C. C. A. 4th, 1944).
144 Justin Potter, 47 B. T. A. 607 (1942).
145 Francis Doll, 2 T. C. 276 (1943) Aff'd Doll v. Commisssioner, 149 F.
(2d) 239 (C. C. A. 8th, 1945) Cert. Applied, June 19, 1945.
146An early and perhaps the best known of these cases is, of course,
Lucas V. Earl, 281 U. S. 111. The doctrine there set forth, namely "that
no distinction can be taken according to the motives leading to the ar-
rangement by which the fruits are attributed to a different tree from that
on which they grew" has foraged far afield to cut down tax saving ar-
rangements within a family. Consider, for example, the recent deci-
sion in Commissioner v. Harmon, 323 U. S. 44 (1944). See also: Helver-
ing v. Horst, 311 U. S. 112 (1940); Helvering v. Eubank, 311 U. S. 122
(1940) ; Harrison v. Schaffner, 312 U. S. 579 (1941). It should be borne
in mind, however, that these cases deal with the assignment of income
and not with the assignment of income-producing property.
147309 U. S. 331 (1940).
'LI Magill, What Shall Be Done with the Clifford CaseF (1945) 45 Col.
L. Rev. 111; Case, The Circuit Courts of Appeals Eamine the Clifford
Doctrine (1943) 7 Md. L. Rev. 201; Merrills, Status of Short Term Trusts
(1943) 28 Wash. U. L. Q. 99; Pavenstedt, The Broadened Scope of Sec-
tion 22 (a): The Evolution of the Clifford Doctrine (1941) 51 Yale L. J.
213; Griswold, A Plan for the Coordination of the Income, Estate and
Gift Tax Provisions with Respect to Trusts and Other Transfers (1942)
56 Harv. L. Rev. 337; Higgins, Recent Developments in the Taxation of
Short-Term Irrevocable Trusts (1942) 30 Geo. L. J. 656; Surrey, The Su-
preme Court and The Federal Income Tax (1941) 35 Ill. L. Rev. 779, 794-
803; Ray, The Income Tax on Short Term and Revocable Trusts (1940)
53 Harv. L. Rev. 1322; James, Family Trusts and Federal Taxes (1942)
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that the Supreme Court, in a case obviously conducive to
success on the part of Government advocacy,'49 held that
income earned by property which a, settlor had placed
irrevocably in trust for a period of five years, the trust
instrument naming the settlor as trustee and giving him
broad powers of control over the res, its income and its
distribution, was taxable to the settlor under Section 22 (a)
of the Internal Revenue Code. Although the many de-
cisions which have been handed down in the post-Clifford
era may be subject to general classification, 150 and although
the uncertainty which the Clifford case created might jus-
tify Congressional action,' 51 the important fact to be borne
in mind for the purposes of the present discussion is the
sweeping rationale of the general doctrine. Speaking for
the Court, Mr. Justice Douglas stated, as a basis for his
decision, that' 52
" * . when the benefits flowing to him indirectly
through the wife are added to the legal rights he
retained, the aggregate may be said to be a fair equiv-
alent of what he previously had . . . For where the
head of the household has income in excess of normal
needs, it may well make but little difference to him
(except income-tax-wise) where portions of that in-
come are routed-so long as it stays in the family
group.))
Family partnership cases present two general patterns
in which an attempt has been made to use the Clifford
doctrine for the purposes of taxing all of the income from
a business to the head of the family. The first of these
is the situation in which no trust device is used, but in
which the head of the family, by means of the partnership
entity, has attempted to split his surtax while at the same
9 U. of Chi. L. Rev. 427; Griswold, A Summary of the Regulations Prob-
lem (1941) 54 Harv. L. Rev. 398, 421422; Nash, Implications of Some Re-
cent Developments in the Tawation of Trusts (1940) 18 Tax Mag. 267;
See also 6 MERTs, LAw OF FEDER"l INCOME TAXATION (1942) §37.17, 37.18.
1I Magill, What Shall Be Done with the Clifford Case (1945) 45 Col.
L. Rev. 111, 115.
150 Case, The Circuit Courts of Appeals Emamine the Clifford Doctrine
(1943) 7 Md. L. Rev. 201.
"I Magill, What Shall Be Done with the Clifford Case (1945) 45 Col.
L. Rev. 111, 127-131.
15 Helvering v. Clifford, 309 U. S. 331, 336 (1940).
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time retaining complete dominion and control over the
income-producing factor of the business. The second pat-
tern, and the one which is the most obvious invitation to
Clifford doctrine application, is the situation in which the
head of a family has placed an interest in a family partner-
ship in trust for a member of his family, thereby nominally
constituting the trustee or the beneficiary a partner in the
family enterprise.
When the sweeping rationale of the Clifford case is
considered in connection with attempted reallocations of
income within a family unit,'53 it is not surprising to find
that the contention has been made that the doctrine should
apply in family partnership cases even though no trust
device is used. 54 It would seem, however, that unless the
153 It is perhaps a conservative estimate that since the Clifford case was
decided, more than one hundred and fifty decisions have been handed
down which bear on its general doctrine. The underlying theme in all
of these cases has been, however, that the settlor of a trust will be
taxed only in the situation in which he in effect remains the owner of
the trust res. Moreover, taxpayers have long since learned to their sorrow
that no argument limiting the Clifford doctrine to the original set of facts
which formulated it will be accepted. Thus in Commissioner v. Buck,
120 F. (2d) 775 (C. C. A. 2nd 1941) a trust was created to last during
the life of the settlor with no reversion unless the beneficiary predeceased
him. The Court, applying the rationale of the Clifford doctrine rather
-than an analogy to its facts, found the settlor taxable. See also William-
son v. Commissioner, 132 F. (2d) 489 (C. C. A. 7th, 1942).
151 Justin Potter, 47 B. T. A. 607 (1942) illustrates an early attempt
to apply the Clifford doctrine to a family partnership pattern in which
no trust device was used. In that case, the taxpayer, a member of a
partnership which was composed of persons other than the members of
his immediate family, made an irrevocable oral gift of part of his in-
terest in the firm to his minor children. Thereafter the taxpayer man-
aged and controlled the interests of the minors in the business in the
same manner as he controlled his own interest. In this situation the
Government took the position that the continued control by the father
over the income-producing factor even after the gift was completed
required that the rationale of Helvering v. Clifford be applied. In denying
this contention the answer of the Board was to the effect that the con-
trol exercised by the father as a partner was merely that of a natural
guardian of a ward's estate and was therefore not the type of control
condemned in the Clifford case. In later decisions, however, the Tax
Court has looked with more favor upon the applicability of the Clifford
doctrine in family partnership cases involving somewhat similar facts.
Thus, in Francis E. Tower, 3 T. C. 396 (1944) Rev'd Tower v. Commis-
sioner, 148 F. (2d) 388 (C. C. A. 6th, 1945) the Court, by way of dictum,
indicated that the continued domination and control by a husband of
his business after the formation of a limited family partnership was suf-
ficient for it to invoke the Clifford rule. In reversing the Tax Court, the
Circuit Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit was content to place its
decision on other grounds. However, in Doll v. Commissioner, 149 F.
(2d) 239 (C. C. A. 8th, 1945) Cert. Applied June 19, 1945, the Circuit
Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit, in determining that local law
was inapplicable in family partnership cases, met the problem by stat-
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case involved the use of a trust, such contentions only
serve to muddy the waters further. The reason for this
lies in the fact that if no trust is employed, the Clifford
doctrine can only be used as a short cut in proving that
no property was transferred from one member of a family
to anothet, and as a result that no assets had been con-
tributed to the firm by one or more of its partners. As
pointed out above, this result has been reached in many
of the cases by an examination of the gift for the purposes
of determining whether or not the donor had surrendered
all of the indicia of ownership and economic control over
its subject matter.'55 In such cases, if the courts have
been satisfied that no gift of property has been made by
one member of a family to another, the partnership has
been disregarded. The advocacy of the Clifford doctrine
in such situations, therefore, does little more than en-
croach upon accepted methods of approach, and serves no
useful purpose. 156
To be distinguished from the family partnership cases
in which no trust device is used are those situations in
which the taxpayer creates a family partnership and places
the interest of one of the partners, a family member, in
trust with himself or some third party as trustee. These
patterns have been the object of Clifford doctrine approach
on the theory that the trust provisions coupled with the
terms, of the partnership agreement point to the fact that
ing that such cases were to be considered with those in which there
was an attempt to reallocate income within a family group. Having taken
this position, the Court emphasized the Clifford approach and applied the
test of whether or not the formation of the partnership made or ef-
fected any substantial change in the taxpayer's economic position.
"I Supra, n. 67-76.
116 But see Eisenstein, Some Iconoclastic Reflections on Tam Adminis-
tration (1945) 58 Harv. L. R. 477, 497-498, in which the point is made
that the Clifford doctrine, in theory, is broad enough to be used in all
instances where legal formalities have been created as a refuge from
surtaxes. Granted that this may be true, the question remains as to
whether or not it is wise policy to abandon accepted methods of approach
which have been found to be workable in favor of a new and uncer-
tain doctrine that can at best result in the same end product. In this
connection, the Tax Court has stated in Robert P. Scherer, 3 T. C. 77
(1944) that it did not believe that there was any reason to say that the
decision in Helvering v. Clifford overruled the long line of cases dealing
with family partnerships, or that its doctrine should be extended so far
as to set aside the well established method of taxing partnership income
to the respective partners and taxing it all to one partner because he
exercised a high degree of managing control.
[VOL. VIII
FAMILY PARTNERSHIPS
the taxpayer has not changed his economic position as a
result of the organization of the firm. Actually, the end
product which is sought in this type of case is the same
as that in which no trust device is used, namely the taxing
of income to the person who earns it without reference
to the validity of the partnership for tax purposes. To the
extent that this approach cuts across accepted methods
which are in existence to determine this question, it is
no more helpful in cases where a trust is used than it is
where no trust has been employed.
There is, however, one feature inherent in the cases
under discussion which might be said to justify the appli-
cation of the Clifford principle. The basis for this dis-
tinguishing feature lies in the fact that the trust instru-
ment, when coupled with the partnership agreement, may
have the effect of pyramiding the sources of control re-
tained by the taxpayer over partnership assets. In such
situations, it should be no answer that a firm has been
formed which would comply with all of the necessary
requirements that must be present before a family part-
nership will be recognized for tax purposes. The exam-
ination should go farther, and should take into considera-
tion the bundle of rights reserved by the taxpayer under
the terms of the trust instrument. When these rights are
added to those reserved to the taxpayer under the partner-
ship agreement, the courts should be at liberty to apply
the rationale of the Clifford case for the purposes of de-
termining to whom the income, which is nominally owned
by the trust, should be taxed.
In justifying the applicability of the Clifford doctrine
to family partnership cases in which a trust device is used,
the courts should keep two important factors in mind.
In the first place, emphasis has been and should be placed
on the character of the trust res in applying the rationale
of the doctrine. It has been held, for instance, that if a
taxpayer creates a trust in which the corpus is an interest
in his business, and if that interest is never in fact delivered
to the trustee but is retained in the enterprise subject to
the complete dominion and control of the grantor, the
1944]
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income nominally owned by the trust or beneficiary will
be taxed to the grantor. 157 The second factor, one which
has been referred to above, is that when considered to-
gether, the terms of the trust instrument and the partner-
ship agreement may well furnish adequate grounds for
holding the grantor taxable. 5s In such situations, a sound
approach should call for a construction of the partnership
agreement and the trust instrument together for the pur-
poses of determining whether or not the transfer had af-
fected. materially the economic position of the taxpayer.'59
A review of the cases which have dealt with the prob-
lem under discussion will reveal the usual inconsistencies.
For instance, before Helvering v. Clifford was decided, tax-
payers were generally successful in meeting the Com-
missioner's contention that income realized by a partner-
ship interest held in trust was taxable to them. 60 Thus,
"'This point has recently been decided in Tyson v. Commissioner, 146
F. (2d) 50 (C. C. A. 8th, 1944). In that case the taxpayer, who conducted
a small loan business, executed an irrevocable trust which named his
wife trustee and his daughter beneficiary. The trust was to terminate
when the daughter became twenty-one, and the entire corpus, which was
an "interest" in the taxpayer's business, was to pass to her. Actually,
nothing was delivered to the trustee, and the taxpayer conducted his
business as he had always done, it being entirely optional with him whether
any part of the profits could be withdrawn by the trustee. The Tax
Court, Richard R. Tyson, T. C. Memo. Op., Dkt. 1165 (March 31, 1944),
held that no completed gift had been made, and that the taxpayer re-
mained taxable under Section 22 (a). This position was affirmed by the
Circuit Court for the Eighth Circuit. See al8o Whayne v. Glenn, 59 F.
Supp. 517 (W. D. Ky. 1945).
158 It may be that this is one of the most overlooked points in all fam-
ily partnership cases. If the quantum of control retained by the tax-
payer is the touchstone in determining his taxability, it is reasonable to
believe that all sources of that control should be examined. In family
partnership cases, both the partnership agreement and the trust instru-
ment are capable of containing provisions relating to control. While it
may be true that in a given case, one or the other of these instruments
might not, of itself, contain sufficient provisions relating to control to
call for the continued taxing of the head of the family, taken together
the instruments might far exceed the requirements set forth in the Cift-
ford case. Courts should constantly be on guard, therefore, to prevent
this type of pyramiding by a careful examination of the partnership
agreement and the trust as parts of a single unit.
"'51n H. G. Whittenberg, Sr., T. C. Memo. Op., Dkt. 2778 (Sept. 13,
1944), the Tax Court reached its conclusion by construing the partner-
ship agreement with the terms of the trust instrument.
111 In M. A. Reeb, 8 B. T. A. 759 (1927) the taxpayer created a trust
for his minor daughter which named the taxpayer's wife trustee. The
trustee was clothed with very broad general and discretionary powers in
the discharge of her duties in the execution of the trust. On the day
after the creation of the trust, the taxpayer formed a partnership in
which his wife as trustee for the daughter was made a partner. Each
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in Rose v. Commissioner,'' a family partnership was recog-
nized for tax purposes even though the taxpayer trans-
ferred only a life interest in his business to himself as
trustee for the benefit of his wife and two daughters and
thereafter retained complete control over the trust res
"as if he were the owner thereof". 112 In a somewhat sim-
ilar situation,163 the Board refused to sustain a deficiency
against the head of a family where an interest in his busi-
ness was given to his wife as trustee for his two minor
children, and where immediately thereafter the husband
and wife individually and as trustees signed a partnership
agreement which provided that the distribution of partner-
ship income was to be made in the sole discretion of the
taxpayer. However, the courts refused to sanction those
situations in which income to be earned by a family part-
nership as distinguished from the assets of the firm itself
were assigned to trustees for the benefit of a family mem-
ber. 64 Such cases were held to be squarely within the
Leininger doctrine.
Cases decided after the promulgation of the Clifford
doctrine have not been uniform in the application of that
doctrine to family partnership patterns in which trustees
of a family trust or its beneficiaries have been made part-
ners in a family business. In Sidney Nathan et al,165 the
taxpayers conveyed a portion of their partnership interest
to themselves and their wives as trustees for their minor
children and subsequently formed a limited partnership
in which the wives, acting as trustees for the children, were
partner executed a note to the firm as a capital contribution, and these
notes were paid off at the end of the first year from partnership profits.
Broad powers of control were conferred on the taxpayer under the part-
nership agreement. The Board held that the Commissioner had erred
in including the income of the minor's trust estate as a part of the tax-
payer's income.
165 F. (2d) 616 (C. C. A. 6th, 1933).
'1' A large portion of the opinion in the Rose case dealt with the ques-
tion of whether the facts under consideration could be distinguished from
the facts In Burnet v. Leininger. Having distinguished the Leininger case,
the Court adopted an ostrich-like attitude, refused to look ahead, and re-
versed the Board.
168 Richard H. Oakley, 24 B. T. A. 1082 (1931).
16, Balkwill v. Commissioner, 77 F. (2d) 569 (C. C. A. 6th, 1935) Cert.
denied 296 U. S. 609 (1935).
'
65 T. C. Memo. Op., Dkts. 102726, 102727, 102728, 102730 (May 14, 1943).
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designated as limited partners. 166 The trusts were irre-
vocable, and were to last until the children reached the
age of thirty-five, at which time an absolute distribution
of corpus was to be made to the beneficiaries.'67 Broad
powers of investment and discretionary powers of distri-
bution of corpus and income were conferred upon the
trustees. The Tax Court decided that the Clifford doctrine
was inapplicable by isolating the trusts and in effect con-
sidering their terms independently from the broad powers
of control retained by each of the partners under the part-
nership agreement. A similar approach was used in Rob-
ert P. Scherer'6 8 and a similar result was reached, although
the Tax Court, had it seen fit to construe the trust instru-
ment and the partnership agreement together, could have
found that the aggregate amount of control retained by the
taxpayer over the income-producing factor at least equalled
that in some of the cases in which the Clifford doctrine had
been successfully applied. 169
The theory advocating the application of the Clifford
doctrine to family partnership patterns in which a family
trustee or the trust beneficiary has been made a partner
has made some headway in the Circuit Courts of Appeals.
In Losh et al. v. Commissioner,"0 the doctrine was applied
116 It will be noticed that the general partners in the Nathan case were
not all members of an immediate family. Moreover, the new or limited
partners were not related except by marriage. What weight this fact
has and will have in the future is difficult to determine. However,
the recognition of a new partner by an old member of the firm who is
not related to the new member should be persuasive of the fact that the
new firm was not -orined entirely as a tax-saving measure.
167 Provision was made, however, for a distribution of accumulated in-
come to the beneficiaries who reached the age of twenty-one, and thereafter
to pay to the beneficiaries income as it was earned.
1683 T. C. 776 (1944).
160 If the trust and partnership agreements are considered together in
the Scherer case, the general picture presented is that a taxpayer has cre-
ated an irrevocable trust for his minor children, in which he has named
his wife as trustee, and in which be has designated an interest in his
business as the trust res. The trust is to last until the beneficiaries reach
the age of twenty-five, at which time it is to terminate and all accumulated
income and corpus will go to them. However, the taxpayer has retained
exclusive control over the business (and hence the trust res), and it is
only within the sole discretion of the taxpayer that the profits of the
business may be distributed. This amount of control over the distribution
of trust income has led one court to invoke the Clifford doctrine. Com-
missioner v. Buck, 120 F. (2d) 775 (C. C. A. 2nd, 1941).
10 145 F. (2d) 456 (C. C. A. 10th, 1944).
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to sustain a deficiency against a tax-payer wno had con-
veyed an interest in his business of selling road oils and
coristruction materials, to himself as trustee for his minor
son under an "Agreement and Declaration of Trust and
Partnership". This document gave the trustee absolute
power of control and management over the trust estate,
the unlimited power to make investments, and the power
to spend the trust income for the comfort, education, train-
ing, support and welfare of the beneficiary. Both the Tax
Court "I' and the Circuit Court of Appeals had no difficulty
in finding that the economic position of the taxpayer had
not been changed by the trust and partnership agreements,
and thus they held that the settlor remained taxable.172
However, in Armstrong v. Commissioner," ' the Circuit
Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit refused to follow
the Clifford approach which had been applied in the Tax
Court,174 in a case in which the taxpayer had agreed to
hold an interest in a family partnership which he had
received as an heir from his father's estate in trust for
his two minor children. The fact that the trustee was
vested with and could exercise all of the powers and priv-
ileges of an owner over the trust estate in the same manner
as an individual could exercise over his individually owned
property was disregarded in favor of the conclusion that
to tax the settlor "would be to say that a father cannot
by deed of trust, no matter how absolute, deed property
"'A. R. Losh, 1 T. C. 1019 (1943) AfJ'd Losh v. Commissioner, 145 F.
(21) 456 (C. C. A. 10th, 1944). It is interesting to note that the Tax
Court stated in the course of its opinion that this case would be con-
trolled by Murphy Shannon Armstrong, 1 T. C. 1008 (1943), and could
be disposed of accordingly on the authority of Helvering v. uff ord. On
appeal, the Circuit Court of Appeals reversed the Tax Court in the Arm-
strong case. Armstrong v. Commissioner, 143 F. (2d) 700 (C. C. A. 10th,
1944). In the Losh case, however, the Circuit Court of Appeals was not
impressed by the similarity. Losh v. Commissioner, 145 F. (2d) 456, 458
(C. C. A. 10th, 1944).
272 The Court clearly defines the issues at the outset of its opinion where
it states, at page 456:
The decision turns upon whether a partnership arrangement effected
a change in the economic status of petitioners within the decision of
the Supreme Court in Helvering v. Clifford, 309 U. S. 331, 60 S. Ct.
554, 84 L. Ed. 788.
173 143 F. (2d) 700 (C. C. A. 10th, 1944).
' Murphy Shannon Armstrong, 1 T. C. 1008 (1943).
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to a child if he himself is the trustee and retains absolute
control and management to the benefit of the estate".' 5
Related to the question of the impact of the Clifford
doctrine on family partnership patterns is the effect to be
given in such cases to Douglas v. Willcuts"6 and Helvering
v. Stuart.7 7  This follows from the combination of the
fact that in some instances income received by a family
partner is or may be used to discharge obligations which
would normally be considered as those of the head of the
family 7 1 and the legal principle that income of a trust
used to discharge the taxpayer's legal obligations remains
taxable to him. 7 9  It has been held that if a beneficiary
of a trust receives income unconditionally it is not taxable
to the settlor merely because the beneficiary might use
the funds for family support. s0 The same result has been
reached where an individual has received unconditionally
income from a family partnership although he has used or
could use the money to satisfy legal obligations of the head
of the family.' 8 ' This conclusion seems sound, especially
in those cases not involving the trust device. Where a
partnership interest is placed in trust thereby making the
trustee or the beneficiary a partner, it is improbable that
the settlor will remain taxable under Section 167(c)'8
*7Armstrong v. Commissioner, 143 F. (2d) 700, 704 (C. C. A. 10tb,
1944).
127 296 U. S. 1 (1935).
177 317 U. S. 154 (1942).
171 Paul, Five Years with Douglas v. Willcuts (1939) 53 Harv. L. Rev. 1.
17Douglas v. Willcuts, 296 U. S. 1 (1935) ; Helvering v. Schweitzer,
296 U. S. 551 (1935) (per curiam) ; Helvering v. Stokes, 296 U. S. 551
(1935) (per curiam), rehearing denied, 296 U. S. 665 (1936) ; Helvering v.
Blumenthal, 296 U. S. 552 (1935) (per curiam).
180 Suhr v. Commissioner, 126 F. (2d) 283 (C. C. A. 6th, 1942). This
case was decided before the Stuart case. For a discussion of whether or
not it has survived, see Guterman, The Stuart Case and its Aftermath
(1944) 57 Harv. L. Rev. 479, 486.
181 E. R. Ledbetter, B. T. A. Memo. Op., Dkt. 104852 (Jan. 19, 1942).
182 This section was amended by the Revenue Act of 1943 §134 to cor-
rect the result reached by the Stuart decision. It provides that "Income
of a trust shall not be considered taxable to the grantor under subsec-
tion (a) or any other provision of this chapter merely because such in-
come, in the discretion of another person, the trustee, or the grantor act-
ing as trustee or cotrustee, may be applied or distributed for support or
maintenance of a beneficiary whom the grantor is legally obligated to




or under the aftermath of the Stuart case.1 3  However,
while of itself not sufficient to invoke the doctrine of the
Douglas and Stuart cases, the fact that the recipient of
income from a family partnership uses the funds to dis-
charge legal obligations normally carried by the head of
a family is at least some evidence that no partnership was
created, and that the parties merely have reallocated in-
come within a given family unit. 84
Conclusion.
Although it has become axiomatic that each family
partnership case must stand on its own merits, it does not
follow that there is an absence of accepted methods of
approach which may be used to determine whether a firm
should be regarded for tax purposes. While the general
outlines of these standards are clear in themselves, it is
sometimes an arduous task to block in the entire picture
with the conflicting facts and charges which are produced
in a given controversy. The complexity of the problem
lies, however, in the difficulty of determining the facts,
a function which has been trusted, in the majority of tax
cases, to a specialized and highly trained court. In con-
's' In Robert P. Scherer, 3 T. C. 776 (1944) the Tax Court said (p. 798) :
We know of no rule of law which would make a wife's income tax-
able to her husband merely because it is expended voluntarily, by
agreement between herself and her husband, for household expenses
of the family.
See also Philip M. McKenna, T. C. Memo. Op., Dkt. 4053 (Sept. 29, 1944)
Sidney Nathan et al., T. C. Memo. Op., Dkts. 102726, 102727, 102728, 102-
730 (May 14, 1943). However, see A. R. Losh, 1 T. C. 1019 (1943) Aff'd
Losh v. 'Commissioner, 145 F. (2d) 456 (C. C. A. 10th, 1944) in which
the Tax Court indicated that the facts under consideration were strong
enough to invoke either the Clifford doctrine or the Stuart doctrine. The
close connection between the rationale of the Douglas and Stuart cases
and the Clifford doctrine is further illustrated by Murphy Shannon Arm-
strong, 1 T. C. 1008 (1943). On appeal, the taxpayer, ignoring the more
far-reaching application of the Douglas case, sought reversal on the theory
that the effect of the Stuart case had been overruled by Congress. Brief
for Petitioner, pp. 51-58, Armstrong v. Commissioner, 143 F. (2d) 700
(C. C. A. 10th, 1944). The Court, in reversing, took the position that the
father was not liable for the support of his son at law school when he
was able to support himself. Moreover, the entire impact of the Stuart
case may not have been eliminated by Congress. See Guterman, The Stu-
art Case and its Aftermath (1944), 57 Harv. L. Rev. 479, 499-506. The
analogy between the Stuart and Clifford cases is discussed in Sprecher,
From Clifford to Stuart (1943) 31 Geo. L. J. 477.
1' This would seem to be the actual approach employed in Murphy
Shannon Armstrong, 1 T. C. 1008, 1018 (1943).
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sidering the general problem all of the evidence should
be weighed, but the substantive effect of local law pro-
visions or decrees should be ignored. The Clifford doctrine
should be considered if trust provisions have been added
to other sources of control retained by the taxpayer, but
should be ignored in cases in which this is not true. And
most important of all, parties who have formed family
partnerships for the sole purpose of reducing their per-
sonal taxes without making corresponding changes in their
economic position should pay their deficiencies and stay
out of court. In so doing, the time, energy and resources
of the Government as well as of the taxpayer would be
saved for more commendable undertakings than the trial
of a tax case which can have only one answer.
